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Given the sheer amount of flights that occur on a daily basis around the world, aviation 
accidents are going to occur.   The principles ensuring that an accident is as safe as possible are 
considered aircraft survivability or crashworthiness which is analyzed using the acronym 
CREEP; Container, Restraint, Environment, Energy Absorption, and Post-Crash Factors.  
CREEP is used by investigators to analyze survivability after a crash, but has significant short 
falls.  By only focusing on a crash, CREEP misses several survivability concepts applicable to 
aviation such as aircraft equipped with ejection seats, inflight environmental factors, and high 
energy projectile strikes.  To develop a more robust and comprehensive definition of CREEP, a 
mixed methods approach was conducted through a literature review, case study research, and 
conducting interviews.  The literature review was done to establish a baseline for CREEP and 
demonstrate its focus on a crash.  Case studies were evaluated and interviews were conducted to 
evaluate escape systems and other deficiencies identified with CREEP.  Several case studies 
involved fatal injuries although no aircraft crash occurred.  Interviews were conducted with 
escape system subject matter experts to identify the survivability of escape systems such as 
parachutes and ejection seats.  Through case study and interview research, a new definition of 
CREEP was established; Container, Restraint, Environment, Energy absorption/Escape, and 
Post-event factors.  By using the new definition of CREEP, investigators don’t have to just focus 
on accidents that involve a crash.  The new acronym is more comprehensive and covers a much 
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1.0 Introduction  
Since the first flight taken by the Wright Brothers in Kitty Hawk, NC, aviation has 
become an integral part of our society.  Humans have only been flying in heavier than air, 
powered aircraft for a little more than a century.  But today humans can fly faster than the speed 
of sound and at altitudes that exceed earth’s atmosphere.  We can put people into orbit around 
the earth, travel throughout space, and transport people and packages to anywhere in the world in 
a matter of hours.  Aviation has fundamentally changed the logistics of how our society 
functions.  
Flying is one of the safest ways modes of transportation.  However, although they are 
rare, aviation accidents capture the attention of the general public, world leaders, and law makers 
alike.  Accident investigations make headlines around the world.  Preventing the accident from 
occurring in the first place is the most effective way to reduce the destruction and costs 
associated with an accident.  However, considering the sheer quantity of flights that occur daily 
throughout the world in commercial, military, and general aviation, accidents are going to occur.  
While the prevention of accidents is the primary concern for many in the aviation safety field, 
accident survivability is also a critical area of focus.  Given the assumption that accidents are 
going to happen, the next best thing that can be done after prevention is to ensure that the event 
is as safe as possible.  This field of study is considered accident survivability or crashworthiness.  
Current crashworthiness standards focus on various systems that aim to increase the safety of 
the aircraft crash.  Accident survivability is synonymous with the word crashworthiness, and is 
analyzed by the acronym CREEP which stands for Container, Restraint, Environment, Energy 
Absorption, and Post-Crash Factors (Davis, 2008).  When evaluating a crash, investigators 




partially survivable.  A survivable crash is one in which each facet of CREEP is within human 
tolerances.  A non-survivable accident is where one or more components of CREEP cause a life 
threatening injury for all occupants of the aircraft.  A partially survivable accident is one in 
which some components of CREEP exceed human tolerance in part or some of the aircraft, but 
are within human tolerances for the remaining parts.   
When evaluating all potential aviation accidents, the current survivability standard has 
significant short falls and does not address many survivability considerations that could be 
experienced during an accident.  United States Code of Federal Regulations (U.S. CFR) define 
an aircraft accident as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes 
place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such 
persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or which the 
aircraft receives substantial damage” (Definitions, 2010).  Lap-held infants and unrestrained 
cargo are not directly addressed by CREEP, although they may contribute to accident 
survivability.  While CREEP focuses on crashworthiness, there is much more to aviation 
survivability than what happens during a crash.   
By only focusing on a vehicle’s impact with terrain, many types of aviation accidents and 
survivability concepts are not captured.  Uncontained engine failures and fires have the potential 
to cause serious injury or death to the occupants of an aircraft, while not necessarily causing the 
aircraft to crash.  Crashworthiness does not address the survivability of occupants that egress the 
aircraft prior to impact with terrain such as aircraft equipped with ejection seats, escape capsules, 
or occupants that can bail out using parachutes.   
Survivability may be impacted by the complex aerospace physiological issues that affect 




flights above 12,500 feet (ft.) or using pressure suits during flights above 40,000 ft. (Jenkins, 
2012).  By only focusing on an aircraft’s impact with terrain, CREEP fails to address the 
complex survivability factors that resulted in the deaths of the Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 
crew, which broke up on re-entry from low earth orbit.   
Due to the limited scope of current survivability principles, CREEP should be expanded and 
redefined to include all accidents, not just those involving an aircrafts impact with terrain.  
Rather than focusing specifically on the crash and crashworthiness, CREEP can be redefined to 
become a comprehensive aviation survivability concept that covers all phases of modern aviation 
and aerospace applications.  This will allow investigators and those participating in accident 
investigations and other aviation safety fields to use CREEP as a universal concept for accident 
survivability.  
2.0 Methods 
To develop a more robust and comprehensive definition of CREEP, a mixed methods 
research approach will be used.  It is important to note that the purpose of this research is to 
redefine the standard for aircraft accident survivability.  As a result, the data collected is not 
intended to test a hypothesis; it is intended to substantiate an expanded definition of the current 
survivability standard.  This will primarily be done by using three different methodologies; a 
literature review, evaluating case studies, and conducting interviews.  
A comprehensive literature review was conducted on defining CREEP to establish a 
baseline.  Shortcomings of CREEP were identified and the literature review demonstrated 
CREEP’s focus on a crash.  However, not all survivability issues have to deal with what happens 
during or after a crash.  For some aviation accidents, a crash doesn’t occur at all.  To emphasize 




After defining CREEP, some accidents were found to show significant deficiencies in the 
survivability acronym. These accidents were evaluated as case studies.  In total, seven case 
studies were identified to include:  
 Delta Airlines Flight 1288 
 Southwest Airlines Flight 1380  
 Trans-Canada Airlines Flight 304 
 British Airtours Flight 28M 
 The Red Bull Stratos Project 
 The Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 accident 
 National Airlines Flight 102 
 United Airlines Flight 232  
The first four case studies focus on penetration or breach of the fuselage of an aircraft 
under conditions outside of an aircraft’s impact with terrain.  In all four cases the aircraft was 
either penetrated and/or breached due to propulsion failures. While all the cases can be defined 
as aviation accidents, none of them crashed.  Although all four accidents resulted in fatalities and 
substantial damage to the aircraft, in two of the accidents, the aircraft never became airborne.  
These accidents were studied in detail and the survivability factors not currently captured by 
CREEP are outlined.  
The Red Bull Stratos project outlined the complex aerospace physiological issues 
associated with survivability in high altitude, low pressure environments.  The project was also 
studied to outline some of the survivability considerations that face parachutists.  Another case 
study that was evaluated was the Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 accident.  In the case of the 




surface of the earth.  The Columbia accident and the survival factors were studied and the 
survival factors outlined.  The last two case studies involve aircraft that ultimately did crash but 
the focus of these case studies was on unrestrained passengers and improperly restrained cargo.  
Neither of those considerations are currently addressed by CREEP.  
In addition to the case studies an additional consideration will be made; escape systems. 
Escape systems include parachutes, ejection seats, and escape modules.  A literature review and 
interviews were conducted to study bailout and ejection seat survival factors.  In total, four 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) were consulted on the subjects of ejection seat and parachute 
performance.  The SMEs are all current employees of the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
have over 110 years combined experience working with parachutes and ejection seats.  Their 
experiences varied from lead research and development engineer, product specialists, in-service 
support engineers, and mishap investigators.   
Once the data was compiled from the case study research, literature review, and SME 
interviews, the new definition of CREEP was developed based on the identified shortcomings of 
the current definition.  The result of this research is a more robust, comprehensive approach to 
survivability.  The new definition of CREEP will address many various aviation applications and 
it will no longer focus on crashworthiness.   
3.0 Literature Review 
3.1 History and Background 
 
Aircraft accident survivability and crashworthiness are synonymous terms.  Crashworthiness 
is defined as “the ability and technology of an aircraft and its internal systems and components to 




for analyzing survivability is CREEP, the history of crashworthiness can be traced back to a 
pioneer of aviation survival research; Hugh DeHaven. 
  DeHaven was a pilot, engineer, and he is considered by many to be the “father of aviation 
crashworthiness” (Hurley, 2002).  Hugh DeHaven volunteered with the Canadian Royal Flying 
Corps after being rejected by the U.S. Army Air Corps during World War I.  In 1917, during a 
training mission, DeHaven was involved in a midair collision with another aircraft which 
resulted in a crash.  DeHaven was the only survivor from the two aircraft and sustained serious 
injuries which included fractured limbs, a ruptured liver, gall bladder, and pancreas (Gangloff, 
2003) (Hurley, 2002). 
During his recovery, DeHaven spent a considerable amount of time analyzing his crash and 
resulting condition.  He concluded that his safety belt was responsible for his injuries.  Following 
his crash, DeHaven was removed from an aviation billet for the remainder of his military career 
and he concluded his commitment with the Canadian Royal Flying Corps as a clerk.  In his new 
position, one of his responsibilities was to collect the remains of deceased aircrew involved in 
accidents.  His responsibilities as a clerk solidified his interest in crashworthiness and accident 
survivability (Gangloff, 2003). 
Due to his exposure, DeHaven became interested in the injuries sustained during crashes and 
noted common injury patterns from the crashes he studied.  He devoted his career to making 
aircraft and automobile crashes as safe as possible.  DeHaven secured funding for research 
through the National Research Council and the Office of Naval Research where he established 
the Crash Injury Research (CIR) program, which grew into the Aviation Crash Injury Research 
(AvCIR) program in 1950.  At Cornell University Medical College, DeHaven studied crashes at 




 Using the knowledge he gained throughout his 30 years studying accidents, in 1956 
DeHaven published the “Four Principles of Packaging for Accident Survival”.  Those principles 
are:  
1. “The package should not open up and spill its contents and should not collapse 
under expected conditions of force and thereby expose objects inside it to 
damage.”  
2. “The packaging structures which shield the inner container must not be made of 
brittle or frail materials; they should resist force by yielding and absorbing 
energy applied to the outer container so as to cushion and distribute impact 
forces and thereby protect the inner container.”   
3. “Articles contained in the package should be held and immobilized inside the 
outer structure by what packaging engineers call interior packaging.  This 
interior packaging is an extremely important part of the overall design, for it 
prevents movement and resultant damage from impact against the inside of the 
package itself.”  
4. “The means for holding an object inside a shipping container must transmit the 
forces applied to the container to the strongest parts of the contained objects.”  
(DeHaven, 1952)  
DeHaven’s principles were some of the first concepts used in the safety engineering 
discipline for optimizing crash survival.  His four principles were instrumental in designing the 
first truly crashworthy aircraft, the AG-1 (Hurley, 2002). The concepts laid out by DeHaven 
would lay the foundation for current crashworthy and aviation survivability standards.  All four 
of DeHaven’s principles are captured to some degree in the modern method used to assess 
crashworthiness, the acronym CREEP.   
3.2 CREEP 
 
CREEP stands for Container, Restraint, Environment, Energy Absorption, and Post-




principles, energy absorption relates to his second principle, and restraint correlates to his third 
and fourth principles.  Under current standards, when analyzing accident survivability, each 
component of CREEP is broken down and independently analyzed.  For an accident to be 
survivable, all aspects of CREEP must be within human tolerances.  If any of the components of 
CREEP are outside of human tolerances, the accident is either partially or completely non-
survivable.  To begin a crashworthy assessment, the accident is analyzed starting with the first 
letter in CREEP, “C”, or container.  
3.2.1 Container 
   
The concept of container is a derivation of DeHaven’s first principle and deals with the 
occupiable space that surrounds the occupants of the aircraft.  The aircraft structure “should 
possess sufficient strength to prevent intrusion of structure into occupied spaces during a 
survivable crash, thus maintaining a protective shell around all occupants” throughout the 
accident (Shanahan, 2004).  This protective shell is often referred to as survivable space or 
survivable volume.  If the aircraft’s occupied space breaks apart, crushes, or allows penetration, 
survivable space for the occupants will not be maintained and the risk of serious injury or death 
significantly increases.  
The design of an aircraft is critically important with respect to container.  Overall aircraft 
structural design, engine configuration, wing configuration, and location of high mass items play 
a significant role in survivability.  On early aircraft, the engines were mounted in the pusher 
configuration which placed propellers and engines behind the pilots which sat in open flight 
decks on the front of the aircraft.  During crashes the engines would break from their mounts and 
displace forward, exposing the pilots to a greater risk of injury.  By simply using a tractor engine 




longer presents the same risk of injury.  If a pusher engine is absolutely necessary, design 
consideration must be made to ensure that there is enough structural integrity of the engine 
mounts to prevent it from displacing forward into the occupied space of the aircraft during a 
crash (DeHaven, 1952).  
Regarding wing configuration, a high wing airplane can place items such as wing box 
structure, fuel cells, and engines above the cabin of the aircraft.  If the wing structure isn’t 
designed to break away, the high mass items contained on the wings could potentially crush the 
cabin, reducing the survivable space available in a crash.  If a low or mid-wing configuration 
isn’t feasible for an aircraft design, consideration must be taken into hardening the fuselage and 
designing the wing structure so that it breaks away reducing the risk of penetrating the cabin 
during a crash. This concept is illustrated in figure 1.  Note the deformation of the wing at the 
wing root and the lack of damage to the fuselage of the cabin (Simula, 1989).   
 
Figure 1: Example Controlled Wing Failure (Simula, 1989) 
 
On utility and heavy lift rotary wing aircraft, high mass items such as the engines, gear 
box, and rotor systems are typically mounted high on the vehicle.  Engines may be designed to 
break away and separate from the aircraft.  The cabin structure may be hardened so that the high 
mass items don’t penetrate the survivable space of the aircraft.  Also unique to rotary wing 
aircraft is the consideration for blade strike prevention.  In an accident, it is possible for the rotor 




considerations should be made to prevent the rotor blades from penetrating occupiable spaces.  If 
a strike cannot be prevented, deflection systems can be used to prevent aircraft penetration.  
Figure 2 shows an example of a blade deflection system installed on the nose of a helicopter just 
in front of the flight deck (Simula, 1989).  
 
Figure 2: Example Blade Strike Deflection System (Simula, 1989) 
 
 The last consideration for container is the structural design of the front of the aircraft to 
prevent plowing or scooping of debris.  When accidents involve high longitudinal velocities, 
plowing “decreases stopping distances and results in higher decelerative loads” (Shanahan, 
2004).  The nose of the aircraft should be shaped properly and be rigid enough to prevent the 
aircraft from digging into the impact surface.  Otherwise accelerations that exceed human 
tolerances may be experienced.   
3.2.2 Restraint 
 
The second survivability component in the acronym CREEP is restraint, which is a 
combination of DeHaven’s third and fourth principles.  Restraints are those systems used to limit 
occupant flail or excursion around the survivable space of the aircraft throughout a crash event.  
They are critical at mitigating the energy of the occupant throughout an accident.  The restraint 




textiles that include lap belts, shoulder belts, or full body harnesses.  These belts are attached to 
seats which are then mounted to aircraft structure.  The system of belts, belt to seat interface, 
seat, seat to aircraft interface, and aircraft structure establish a total restraint system that is 
considered the “occupants tie-down chain” (Lee, 2006).  Failure of the occupant tie-down chain 
to properly restrain an occupant significantly increases the risk of blunt force trauma due to 
excess occupant flail and subsequent contact with aircraft structure.    
Blunt force trauma was the primary cause of the fatal injuries experienced in civilian 
helicopter accidents between 1993 and 1999.  They accounted for 88% of the deaths in the 74 
fatal accidents studied.  Of the blunt force trauma injuries experienced, 62% of those injuries 
were to the head and 61% were to the thoracic region of the body (Taneja & Wiegmann, 2003).  
Restraint systems are the most effective ways to limit occupant flail and contact injuries during 
an accident.  To minimize occupant flail, the restraint system should be designed appropriately 
for the location where it is being implemented.  
Restraint systems are classified based on how many points of attachment they have with 
the belt to seat interface.  For example, a two-point restraint system is typically just a simple lap 
belt with one attachment point on each side of the occupant’s pelvis.  Two-point restraints are 
commonly used on passenger commercial aircraft seats.  A three-point restraint is commonly 
used in modern automobiles, includes a lap belt, and a single shoulder strap.  Restraint systems 
can vary from two up to five or more points.  Modern military aircraft use five-point restraints in 
crew seats and the racing industry has utilized up to seven points in their restraint systems.  Table 
1 summarizes commonly used restraint systems in the aviation industry along with a brief 





 Table 1: Restraint System Types and Application 
Restraint Type Description Application 
two-point Lap Belt Airline Passenger Seats 
three-point Lap Belt, Single Shoulder Belt 
Automobile Seats, General 
Aviation Aircraft Seats 
four-point Lap Belt, Two Shoulder Belts 
Flight Attendant Seats, Pilot 
Seats, Automotive Racing 
Seats 
five-point 
Lap Belt, Two Shoulder Belts, 
Tie-Down Strap 
Military Rotary Wing Pilot 
Seats 
 
The more points a restraint system has, the less the occupant will flail and displace 
throughout a crash.  A two-point restraint is the least effective at minimizing occupant flail.  
With just a simple lap belt, an occupant’s head and upper torso are free to displace.  As 
previously stated, a majority of blunt force trauma injuries experienced during helicopter crashes 
are to the head and thoracic region of the body.  Due to the use of two-point restraints and the 
lack of proper restraint, head injuries are the most commonly experienced serious or fatal injury 
observed during general aviation accidents (Davis, 2008).  The use of at least a three-point 
restraint can significantly decrease occupant flail.  
Restraining the upper torso can significantly reduce the displacement of the chest and 
head.  Figures 3 and 4 show the flail envelope of a sample occupant using a two-point and a four-
point restraint system after being exposed to a longitudinal acceleration (Simula, 1989).  By 
using a four-point restraint, head displacement is reduced by roughly 50%.  The unrestrained 





Figure 3: Flail Envelope using a 2-Point Restraint (Simula, 1989) 
 
Figure 4: Flail Envelope using a 4-Point Restraint (Simula, 1989) 
 
If any objects are placed the flail envelope of the occupant during a crash such as a 
control stick, yoke, or instrument panels, blunt force trauma injuries are likely.  A two-point 
restraint system will not prevent contact with aircraft controls or the instrument panel if used on 
pilot or co-pilot seats of an aircraft.  As seen in figure 3, if anything is within the occupant’s 
reach while sitting upright, it would also be within the head flail envelope if using a two-point 
restraint.  Using two-point restraints at crew positions significantly increases the risk of blunt 
force trauma injuries being experienced to the head or torso region of the body.   
 Another important consideration for restraint is how the tie-down chain transmits loads 




structure must be designed with enough strength to react the expected crash loads imparted by 
the occupant.  Failure of the seat or support structure will cause a break in the tie-down chain and 
as a result, the occupant will become a projectile as they will be free to move about the aircraft.  
The belts of the restraint itself must be designed to react loads appropriately including how they 
integrate with the occupants themselves.   
The restraints that interface with the human must be designed appropriately and should 
apply crash loads properly to the body to prevent serious injury.  The restraints used on 
crashworthy seats are rated to transmit loads measured in the thousands of pounds.  For example, 
the shoulder straps on some pilot seats are rated to over 5,000 pounds (Simula, 1989).  The 
skeletal system is the only biomechanical structure in the human body equipped to react the high 
loads experienced in a crash.  
It is critical that lap belts be routed over the iliac crest of the pelvis and shoulder belts be 
routed over the clavicle.  Soft tissue of the human body tends to rip, tear, and rupture under the 
dynamic loading associated with a crash.  Failure of the restraint belts to impart loads into the 
skeletal system of the occupant can result in serious or potentially fatal injuries (Hurley, 2002).  
The injuries experienced by Hugh DeHaven during his crash were likely associated with his lap 
belt migrating over his abdomen at some point during the crash.  The loads imparted by his lap 
belt lacerated and ruptured the soft tissue organs in his abdominal cavity.  
3.2.3 Environment 
 
After evaluating container and restraint, the first “E” in CREEP, environment must be 
analyzed.  Environment “refers to the space that any portion of his body may occupy during 
dynamic crash conditions” (Shanahan, 2004).  It is important to safe the objects in the immediate 




consoles, yokes, cyclic controls, passenger tray tables, or any other object the occupant may 
strike while restrained during an accident.  The delethalization of the occupant’s local 
surroundings and proper restraint is critical to ensuring that a survivable environment exists.  
Designers should keep hard, rigid objects as far away from occupants as possible.  If it is not 
possible to keep object out of the flail envelope, considerations should be made to add padding 
or design the object to be frangible or break away (Shanahan, 2004).   
Flail analysis should be conducted to minimize rigid aircraft structures within an 
occupants flail envelope.  The prevalence of head injuries during crashes emphasizes the need 
for a systematic approach to survivability.  While not necessarily a part of the aircraft design, 
supplemental systems such as helmets can significantly reduce the risk of head injury and 
increase survivability during an accident.  
In addition to proper design the occupant’s surroundings, it is also important to ensure 
that an occupant’s immediate surroundings are able to support life.  Clean, oxygenated air is 
necessary to ensure the survivability of occupants throughout the crash event.  “Pyrolyzation 
products from fires involving electrical insulation and the polyurethane sound-attenuating or 
decorative panels can produce inflight incapacitation which reduces survival chances” (United 
States, 1991, 24-3).  Risk of injury due to smoke exposure is a generally a function of smoke 
composition, concentration, and duration of exposure.  More specifics on smoke exposure can be 
found in section 3.2.5.  The effects of smoke exposure can be mitigated by having supplemental 
breathing devices available in case an inflight fire breaks out in the aircraft.   
3.2.4 Energy Absorption  
 
The second “E” in CREEP represents energy absorption which refers to the process of 




second principle.  Kinetic energy (KE) represents a significant source of energy at an aircraft’s 
initial impact.  As seen in equation 1, KE is proportional to the square of velocity so relatively 
small increases in the aircraft velocity result in large increases in KE (Hurley, 2002).  
                                                         𝐾𝐸 =
1
2
𝑚 ∗ ?⃗? 2                                               (1) 
  
                                                 Where:      KE = Kinetic Energy 
  m = Mass 
  V= Velocity 
Velocity is a vector meaning that it has both a magnitude and direction.  A velocity 
vector can be broken down into its components of longitudinal, lateral, and vertical values.  The 
energy associated with the aircraft’s horizontal and lateral velocities are typically dissipated 
throughout the aircraft slide out.  For most conditions, the longer the slide out given uniform 
terrain conditions, the lower the accelerations the occupants will experience.  This concept can 
be seen illustrated in figure 5.  The accelerations experienced in example A would be 
significantly lower than the accelerations experienced in example B given the same impact 
velocity.  
 




The vertical energy however, is not so easy to dissipate as a long slide out isn’t possible. 
There isn’t as much space between the bottom of the aircraft and the ground.  For vertical 
energy, a systematic, comprehensive approach must be taken.  Vertical energy absorption is 
typically accomplished via the local terrain and aircraft energy absorbing systems.  The terrain 
the aircraft impacts has the potential to absorb energy.  If gouge marks as seen in figure 5 are 
present at the initial impact site, the depth of the gouge represents additional displacement and as 
a result, energy absorption.  Soft surfaces such as sand, soil, or snow will absorb more energy 
than harder surfaces such as concrete or rocky terrain.  In addition to terrain, energy absorption 
can also occur from aircraft deformations and energy absorbing systems.  
Energy absorbing systems include landing gear, aircraft structure, and crashworthy seats 
(Shanahan, 2004).  Crashworthy structures absorb energy in a crash through very controlled, 
predictable, and repeatable deformations.  This deformation, just like the crumble zones in 
modern cars, reduces the loads experienced by the occupants of the aircraft by spreading out the 
crash over a longer distance and time.  The displacement that occurs during a crash due to energy 
absorption is illustrated in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Example Energy Absorbing Systems (Simula, 1998) 
 
Energy absorbing aircraft structures slow the rate of descent by increasing the distance 




occur in an aircraft, figure 7 shows the effect of energy absorption. Figure 7 illustrates the 
vertical position, velocity, and acceleration experienced by an occupant in a crash.  The bottom 
of the figure shows the distance traveled or displacement (ft.) while the middle shows the 
velocity (ft/sec) and the top shows the resulting acceleration (ft./sec
2
).  The solid line represents 
the aircraft structure as if there were no energy absorption taking place while the dashed line 
represents crashworthy structures being used.  By using energy absorbing structures, the peak 
accelerations (GL) are significantly reduced compared to aircraft accelerations (GM) without 
using energy absorbing technology (Simula, 1989). 
 
Figure 7: Energy Absorption Effects (Simula, 1998) 
Minimizing the accelerations experienced by the occupants of the aircraft reduces the 
forces they experience.  Based on Isaac Newton’s second law, force is directly proportional to 




Acceleration and force are vector quantities having both a direction and magnitude.  Newton’s 
second law is represented by equation 2 (Hurley, 2002).  
                                                                𝐹 = 𝑚 ∗ 𝐴                                                (2) 
  
Where:  F = Force 
   m = Mass 
   A= Acceleration 
 
Human tolerances to whole body impacts vary based on several factors such as the 
direction to which they are applied, as well as the age, sex, and general state of health of the 
individual.  Generally for most people, human tolerances to accelerations are the highest in the 
longitudinal (X) direction which is considered eye balls in or out.  They are the lowest is in the 
lateral (Y) direction which is considered eye balls left or right.  Some of the most common 
acceleration based injuries in aviation are in the vertical direction (Z) or eye balls up or down.  
When exposed to vertical accelerations, the spinal column is typically the limiting factor for 
injuries.  Vertebral fractures of the lower thoracic and lumbar region of the spinal column are 
common when exposed to accelerations over 20 Gs (Davis, 2008).  Intervertebral disks are also 
at risk of herniation or rupture as the spine is compressed during vertical accelerations.  Figure 8 
shows the coordinate system used for accelerative human tolerances (Davis, 2008).   
 





 Another consideration to be taken into account when discussing human tolerance to 
accelerations, are the biological variabilities that exist between individuals.  In general, a 
person’s ability to react the loads associated with a crash is directly a function of their 
biomechanical ability to react the loads.  The musculoskeletal system is the body’s primary 
biomechanical mechanism to carry and transmit loads.  The strength of an individual’s 
musculoskeletal system is a function of factors such as age, sex, and general state of health.  
Typically, a young adult will have the highest tolerance to impacts.  As bone density decreases 
with age, the ability to react loads decreases.  With regard to sex, factors such as mass 
distribution, bone density, and muscle mass can influence tolerance to impacts.  Men typically 
have higher muscle mass and bone densities compared to women and as a result can withstand 
higher accelerations.   General state of health plays a critical role in an individual’s tolerance to 
crash loads.  Factors such as chronic medical conditions and poor physical conditioning may 
significantly degrade an individual’s ability to react crash loads (Shanahan, 2004). A summary of 
typical whole body acceleration limits can be seen in table 2 (Motley, 2005).  The values in table 
2 represent typical  acceleration tolerances of a healthy young adult.  Table 3 summarizes some 
common accelerative and impact injuries that occur during crashes with the corresponding 
accelerations at which they occur (Lee, 2006). 
Table 2: Whole Body Acceleration Limits  (Motley, 2005, p 245) 
Position Limit (G) 
Duration 
(Sec) 
Eyeballs Out (+Gx) 45 0.1 
25 0.2 
Eyeballs In (-Gx) 83 0.04 
Eyeballs Down (-Gz) 20 0.1 
Eyeballs Up (+Gz) 15 0.1 





Table 3: Common Acceleration Injuries (Lee, 2006, p 94) 
Injury Acceleration (Gs) 
Pulmonary Contusion 25 G 
Vertebral Body Compression 20-30 G 
Fracture Dislocation of C-1 on C-2 20-40 G 
Aorta Intimal Tear 50G 
Aorta Transection 80-100G 
Pelvic Fracture 100-200G 
Vertebral Body Transection 200-300 G 
Total Body Fragmentation 350+ G 
Concussion 
60 G over 0.02 sec 
100 G over 0.005 sec 
180 G over 0.002 sec 
  
3.2.5 Post-Crash Factors 
 
The last component of CREEP is post-crash factors which includes anything that can 
impact survivability after the crash is over. This includes considerations such as a post-crash fire, 
water impact, exposure to the elements, availability of medical care, and prompt rescue 
operations (Lee, 2006) (Shanahan, 2004).  One of the most important factors impacting 
survivability after a crash is the presence of a post-crash fire (United States, 1991). 
 As a result of impact forces during a crash, fuels can vaporize and aircraft damage can 
compromise the fuel storage systems which allow the fuel to come in contact with various 
ignition sources.  While crashworthy fuel systems have drastically reduced the occurrence of 
post-crash fires on military rotorcraft, these systems are rarely used on commercial or general 
aviation fixed wing aircraft (United States, 1991).  On large aircraft, passengers can have as little 
as 50 seconds to escape before fire engulfs the cabin.  In cases of severe fire, they may have as 
little as 7 seconds before incapacitation (Lee, 2006).   
A post-crash fire presents several hazards to the occupants to include heat injury and 




the integumentary and respiratory systems.  At temperatures above 111 °F, the rate of cellular 
destruction in the skin increases which can cause injury (Simula, 1989).  Skin burns can be 






 degree, and 4
th
 degree burns.  1
st
 
degree burns are the most superficial while 4
th
 degree burns are the most severe.  4
th
 degree burns 
likely result in amputation and can possibly lead to death. Table 4 summarizes burn 
classifications and the extent of damage (Tintinalli, 2010).  
Table 4: Skin Burn Injury Severity (Tintinalli, 2010) 
Type Layers Involved or Damaged 
1
st
 Degree Epidermis Layer 
2
nd
 Degree Epidermis, Dermis Layer 
3
rd
 Degree Epidermis, Dermis, and Hypodermis Layer 
4
th
 Degree Epidermis, Dermis, Hypodermis, Subcutaneous Layer, and Bone 
 Respiratory injuries are also common in aviation accidents due to post-crash fire which 
are caused by the inhalation of hot gasses.  While the mechanisms of alveoli damage due to the 
inhalation of hot gasses is well understood, the research covering the human tolerances to 
respiratory system thermal damage is not very comprehensive.  Live subject testing is not 
possible due to the ethical considerations required to conduct such research.  While respiratory 
injury due to heat is possibly incapacitating for occupants involved in a post-crash fire, “there are 
not enough data available to establish and escape limit threshold” (Simula, 1989).  
In addition to the heat related injuries associated with a fire, the prevalence of toxic 
gasses also present a major hazard.  Gasses that are present in a burning aircraft include carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen chloride, and hydrogen 
cyanide (Simula, 1989).  The risk of injury due to exposure to toxic gasses is a function of gas 
concentration and duration of exposure.  Table 5 summarizes some of the concentrations and 




Table 5: Tolerance to Combustion Gasses (Simula, 1998, p. 27) 
Gas 






Less than 30 50,000 




Less than 30 3,000 




Less than 30 400 




Less than 30 240 




Less than 30 1,000 




Less than 30 200 
30  100 
60-120 50 
  To minimize the effect of a post-crash fire, emergency egress must be accomplished 
immediately.  The ability for everyone to identify, move to, open, and use emergency egress 
hatches are critical to reduce the risk of injury due to a post-crash fire or water egress.  They 
must be easy to identify in a degraded visual environment.  Emergency lighting which directs 
occupants toward egress locations can be extremely important for quick egress from a smoke 
filled, dark, or underwater aircraft cabin.  Emergency egress location must be easy to access in 
an aircraft that is upside down and sinking in water and they must be hardened to ensure that 
they are still operational after a crash.   
Naval and offshore oil operations heavily use helicopters to fly over water at much higher 
rates when compared to other industries.  Helicopters, by design, have a very high center of 




high center of mass, the aircraft are susceptible to roll over (Shanahan, 2004).  Egress is of 
significant interest, as most helicopters will flip and sink shortly after impact with the water.   
Factors such as crashworthy energy absorbing seats can potentially affect egress from a 
sinking aircraft.  When tested using a Modular Egress Training Simulator (METS) egress times 
increased when using stroking seats (Taber, 2013).  Training has the potential to significantly 
increase survivability.  When conducting egress training, it is important that participants be 
trained and familiar with overcoming the adverse reactions with energy absorbing seats, possible 
environmental conditions, and the varying positions of the helicopter during an emergency water 
egress event.  
Once egress from the aircraft has been accomplished, there are several post-crash factors 
to consider including exposure to the elements.  When an aircraft ditches or crashes on water, it 
is important that occupants of the aircraft have flotation systems available.  This can be 
accomplished by using individual flotation systems or rafts that can accommodate larger groups 
of people.  After the aircraft impacts water, it should be expected that the occupants of the 
aircraft are to remain afloat until rescue operations can be accomplished as it cannot be assumed 
that everyone on the aircraft is proficient at swimming or treading water.  Therefore it is critical 
that every occupant of the aircraft have at least one type of flotation system at their disposal.   
Another consideration for exposure to the elements is the weather conditions at the time 
of the crash.  Weather is very different than the CREEP consideration environment.  
Environment with respect to CREEP refers to the local surrounding of the occupant inside the 
aircraft throughout a crash.  Weather is a post-crash factor and refers to the weather extremes 
that have the potential to cause various injuries such as hyperthermia and hypothermia.  




ambient temperatures.  Heat injuries are commonly a function of exposure time, temperature, and 
relative humidity.  A common measure for risk of heat injury is the heat index.  Figure 9 shows 
the relative risk of injury as a function of temperature and relative humidity (Heat Index).  High 
ambient temperatures with high relative humidity increase the risk of heat-related injuries.  
  
Figure 9: Heat Index (Heat Index) 
 
On the other side of the weather extreme, hypothermia and frostbite are common weather 
injuries associated with low ambient temperatures.  When temperatures are below freezing, 
frostbite and hyperthermia can be experienced.  The risk of hypothermia significantly increases 
when low ambient temperatures are combined with water exposure.  When exposed to both cold 




the risk of death when exposed to cold water is a function of water temperature and duration of 
exposure (United States, 1986).   
 
Figure 10: Cold Water Immersion Chart (United States, 1986) 
  
When exposed to cold water and low ambient temperatures, it is important that flotation 
systems get the aircraft occupants of the out of the water as soon as possible.  Oftentimes, 
personal flotation systems will only help personnel stay afloat while rafts will get people out of 
the water.  If operations are known to be conducted over cold water, the use of anti-exposure 
suits can significantly increase the chances for survival if the aircraft were to crash.  
Another consideration to make for exposure to the elements is wildlife interaction.  As it 
can be seen in figure 10, at temperatures above about 66 degrees Fahrenheit (ºF), a shark attack 
hazard is present.  Sharks are the most common predators experienced when stranded at sea.  But 
when an accident occurs on land, predators such as bears, lions, tigers, wolves, and coyotes 
should be considered.  During an accident, the various injuries experienced by the aircraft 
occupants may attract predators to the crash site regardless of whether the accident occurs at sea 
or on land.  In addition to predators, venomous and poisonous wildlife have the potential to cause 




emergency rescue and immediate access to medical attention can significantly increase the 
probability of survivability.  
Prompt access to medical care can significantly reduce the risk of critical injuries 
resulting in fatal injuries.  Immediately after egress has occurred, and it is safe to do so, it is 
important for the medical condition of everyone involved in the crash to be evaluated and first 
aid be rendered if possible.  If first aid isn’t possible on scene, it is necessary that the victims of 
the crash be recovered and medical attention provided immediately.  
A fast rescue operation can improve survivability in many ways.  The quicker the rescue, 
the faster advanced medical care can be given, and the risk of injury due to exposure to the 
elements is reduced.  For example, on January 15, 2009, US Airways flight 1549 ditched into the 
Hudson River shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport.  The water temperature was about 
36 °F and the ambient temperature was 21 °F.  Hypothermia was a serious hazard to the 
occupants of the aircraft.  However, due to the location of where the aircraft ditched, commuter 
ferries were on scene recovering occupants of the aircraft in less than 10 minutes (NTSB, 2009).  
Due to the immediate response and recovery efforts, there were no fatalities from US Airways 
Flight 1549.  Had the aircraft ditched in the Atlantic Ocean where recovery wasn’t measured in 
minutes but rather hours, it is likely that many would have perished due to hypothermia.  
4.0 Results 
 With CREEP defined, its focus on the crash is very clear.  As mentioned in section 2.0, 
there have been several aviation accidents that have occurred throughout history which are not 
currently covered by CREEP.  While the list of mishaps chosen does not represent an exhaustive 
list, each case study emphasizes a deficiency with CREEP. Each case study summarizes the 




4.1 Case Studies  




On July 6, 1996, a McDonnell Douglas MD-88 experienced an engine failure during 
takeoff from Pensacola Regional Airport, Florida.  The flight was conducted under Part 121 
scheduled, air carrier operations and was operated as Delta Airlines flight 1288.  There were a 
total of 144 people onboard the aircraft of which two received fatal injuries, two received serious 
injuries, and three received minor injuries.  
During the aircraft’s takeoff roll, the number 1 engine experienced an uncontained failure 
which resulted in significant damage to the fuselage.  Without getting airborne, the crew aborted 
takeoff and stopped roughly 1400 ft. down the runway.  After the aircraft came to rest, the flight 
crew initiated an emergency evacuation.  The accident aircraft can be seen in figure 11; note the 
damage to the fuselage.  
 
Figure 11: Damage to MD-88 Fuselage (NTSB, 1997) 
The source of the engine failure was determined to be a fatigue failure of the compressor 
fan hub which was caused by a manufacturing defect.  A drilling process during manufacture 




microstructure produced a stress concentration which would ultimately form a fatigue crack.  
The inspection techniques employed by the engine manufacturer and Delta did not detect the 
fatigue crack.  On the accident flight, the fatigue crack propagated ultimately causing failure of 
the entire assembly.  The failed compressor hub assembly and other engine components escaped 
the engine case and penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft resulting in an uncontained engine 
failure (NTSB, 1997). 
4.1.1.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
Of the 144 people onboard the aircraft, two passengers were killed in the accident. 
Emergency evacuation was initiated immediately after the aircraft came to rest in which some 
passengers egressed using the emergency slides.  Once the aircraft was determined to be safe and 
there was no risk of fire, emergency egress was stopped to reduce the risk of further injury to the 
passengers and crew.  Roughly 20 to 30 minutes after the accident, air stairs were brought to the 
aircraft and the remaining passengers and crew disembarked without any further injuries. 
Most of the damage to the fuselage occurred in the proximity of row 37 on the port side 
of the aircraft.  There were roughly four to five separate areas where engine components 
penetrated the fuselage.  Parts of the fan assembly exited the cabin, and a piece of the engine 
spinner lodged into the ceiling.  The damage to the interior of the aircraft can be seen in figures 
12 and 13.  
 






Figure 13: Damage to MD-88 Fuselage at Row 37 (NTSB, 1997) 
 
Medical, pathological, and the seat location information for the two fatal passengers were 
not provided in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) survivability report.  The 
report only stated that “another passenger who was a physician began treating the unconscious 
passenger who had sustained a severe head injury” (NTSB, 1997, p.4).  While not explicitly 
stated, the fatal injuries experienced by the passengers were likely due to the engine components 
penetrating the aircraft.  Based on the damage to the aircraft structure seen in figures 12 and 13, 
the passengers seated in proximity to row 37 were exposed to very high energy projectiles 
immediately following the engine failure.  Being struck with any of the engine components as 
they tore through the aircraft could have resulted in serious or fatal injuries (NTSB, 1997). 




On April 17, 2018, roughly 30 minutes after takeoff, a Boeing 737-7H4 experienced an 
engine failure while climbing through 32,000 ft. after departing LaGuardia Airport in New York.  
The flight was conducted under Part 121 scheduled air carrier operations and was operated as 
Southwest Airlines Flight 1380.  There were a total of 149 people onboard the aircraft to include 
five crew and 144 passengers.  Of the 149 people, one passenger received fatal injuries and eight 




While climbing to cruising altitude during initial climb out, the number one engine 
experienced a failure which caused pieces of the engine inlet and fan cowling to separate the 
aircraft.  Part of the engine cowling struck the fuselage causing one of the cabin windows to fail 
and depart the aircraft. After separation of the cabin window, rapid decompression of the 
fuselage occurred.  Due to the engine failure and loss of cabin pressure, the crew conducted an 
emergency descent and successfully landed at Philadelphia International Airport roughly 17 
minutes after the engine failure.   
The engine failure was determined to be caused by a low-cycle fatigue crack that formed 
in the number 13 fan blade which ultimately caused the blade to fail and separate inflight.  Once 
the fan blade separated, it impacted the engine’s fan case in a critical structural location causing 
it to fail.  Once the fan case failed, it separated the aircraft striking the port side wing, fuselage, 
and horizontal stabilizer (NTSB, 2019).    
4.1.2.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
The only fatality was a passenger seated in 14A which was adjacent to the failed cabin 
window.  The window measured 10.5 inches horizontally, 14.375 inches vertically, and 15 
inches diagonally.  The accident aircraft and cabin window can be seen in figures 14 and 15.  





Figure 14: Damage to 737 #1 Engine and Cabin Window (NTSB, 2019, p. 78) 
 
Figure 15: Cabin Window Dimensions (NTSB, 2019, p. 41) 
Shortly after the aircraft experienced loss of cabin pressure, flight attendants conducted a 
walk-through to assist passengers in donning their supplemental oxygen masks.  During this 
process, a flight attendant noticed that the passenger seated in 14A was partially outside the 
aircraft while still being restrained by her lap belt.  The passenger’s upper torso, arms, and head 
were outside the failed cabin window.  With assistance from other passengers, the flight 
attendants were able to bring the passenger back inside the aircraft and initiate cardiopulmonary 






Figure 16: Cabin Seat 14A (NTSB, 2018, p. 5) 
The cause of death for the fatal passenger was determined to be blunt force trauma to the 
head, neck, and torso.  She experienced disarticulation of the spine at C6-C7 and at T5-T6.  She 
also experienced subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages, bilateral orbital roof fractures, and 
multiple left side rib fractures.  The mechanism of her death was due to the lack of upper body 
restraint and being exposed to the aerodynamic forces outside the aircraft while being restrained 
in her seat. While the two-point restraint worn by the passenger would restrain the passenger’s 
pelvis to the seat, it would not prevent displacement of her upper body.  The lack of upper body 
restraint allowed the upper torso to exit the failed cabin window.  The aerodynamic forces 
experienced when exposed to the outside airflow resulted in the passenger’s blunt force trauma 
injuries (NTSB, 2018).  




On July 9, 1956, a Viscount CF-TGR Type 724 experienced an engine failure and lost a 
number four propeller in flight.  The aircraft was operating as Trans-Canada Air Lines Flight 304 




Toronto and Ottawa. The aircraft had 31 passengers and four crew onboard.  While flying in the 
vicinity of Flat Rock, Michigan, an engine issue developed which caused the crew to conduct an 
emergency descent.  While descending, the propeller from the number four engine broke free 
from the hub and blades passed through the fuselage, killing one passenger.  
The cause of the propeller failure was due to over speed.  While in cruise, the crew 
noticed a drop in engine Revolutions per Minute (RPM) on the number four engine from a 
nominal speed of 13,600 RPM.  Shortly after, the engine returned to normal speed and remained 
there for about five minutes before it increased rapidly to about 14,000 RPM. The crew 
unsuccessfully attempted to feather the propeller so they decoupled the propeller from the engine 
and shut down the number four engine.  They declared an emergency and conducted an 
emergency descent at near maximum airspeed.  During the emergency descent the aircrew could 
hear the over speed of the wind-milling propeller before it failed at about 9,000 ft. (CAB, 1957). 
4.1.3.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
When the propeller failed, blades tore through the fuselage of the aircraft killing one 
passenger and injuring six others to include one of the crew.  There was major cabin damage in 
the area of the two forward most rows of seats caused by the failed propeller.  Roughly ten 
minutes after the emergency descent started and the propeller failed, the aircraft landed safely in 
Winsor, Ontario without further incident.  There was no medical or pathological information 
provided in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) report for the injuries sustained by the 
passengers and it was only noted that one crew member received a minor head injury (CAB, 
1957). 
There were no photographs provided by the CAB for the accident aircraft.  The exact 




only noted as “major” (CAB, 1957).  Once the propeller failed and penetrated the aircraft, 
occupants were exposed to very high kinetic energy projectiles.  Being struck by any of the 
projectiles could have resulted in serious or fatal injuries.  




On August 22, 1985, a Boeing 737-236 aircraft experienced an uncontained engine 
failure to its number one engine during takeoff from Manchester International Airport in the 
United Kingdom.  The aircraft was operating as British Airtours Flight 28M and was carrying 
131 passengers and six crew.  Before becoming airborne, roughly 30 seconds after the start of its 
takeoff roll, the engine failed as the aircraft achieved a maximum airspeed of 125 knots.  
Immediately after the engine failure the crew aborted takeoff informed Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) of their situation.  Pieces of the engine struck the left wing and punctured a fuel tank 
access panel causing fuel to leak from the wing tank.  The leaking fuel contacted the failed 
engine and ignited.  As the aircraft was still slowing down, ATC confirmed that the aircraft was 
on fire, and the captain informed the crew that they would need to evacuate from the right side of 
the aircraft.  
When the aircraft came to rest, the captain stopped the aircraft such that winds from 250 
degrees at roughly seven knots, carried the fire onto the fuselage.  Shortly after coming to rest, 
fire and smoke filled the cabin.  The aft right side door was opened just prior to the aircraft 
coming to rest accelerating the rate at which the cabin filled with smoke.  Emergency egress was 





Figure 17: Boeing 737 Fire Damage (AAIB, 1989, p. 3) 
 
 
Figure 18: Boeing 737 Fire Damage (AAIB, 1989, p. 3) 
The engine failure was caused by the number nine combustor can.  The combustor can 
ruptured, resulting in a catastrophic failure of the Combustion Chamber Outer Case (CCOC).  
The combustor can and CCOC failure caused the fan case to shatter which allowed the number 
nine combustor can to exit the engine case.  After leaving the case, the can struck the underwing 
fuel tank access panel causing it to fail.  Once the fuel tank access panel failed, fuel was free to 
flow from the wing tank onto the engine which started the fire (AAIB, 1989). 
4.1.4.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
Of the 137 people onboard the aircraft, 55 people received fatal injuries while 15 
received serious injuries.  48 people died directly as a result of toxic smoke exposure, six people 
died of high thermal exposure, and one person died as a result of severe pulmonary damage and 




fatality recovered still alive from the aircraft by first responders.  The remaining 54 fatalities died 
while still in the aircraft before being recovered.    
While emergency egress was immediately initiated after the aircraft came to rest, there 
were several factors that contributed to people’s inability to successfully escape the burning 
aircraft.  A primary factor was the captain’s positioning of the aircraft.  Figure 19 shows the 
static fire plume that engulfed the aircraft.  Note the position of flames relative to the egress 
locations marked by red arrows.  
 
Figure 19: Flight 28M Static Fire Plumes (AAIB, 1989, Appendix 8 fig g)  
The forward cabin doors and the right side over wing hatch were only egress paths that 
could be used.  The aft right side cabin door couldn’t be used as it was quickly engulfed by 
flames.  The forward cabin doors were type I emergency exits while the over wing hatch was a 
type III emergency exit.  The right side forward and right side over wing emergency egress exits 
did not immediately open.  The failure of the few usable emergency egress hatches was also a 
significant contributing factor for people not being able to egress the aircraft.  
The forward door jammed and took over one minute to open after the aircraft came to 




wasn’t opened until 45 seconds after the aircraft came to rest.  For the first 45 seconds, the only 
available emergency egress door was in the front left of the aircraft as two of the three 
emergency exits that could be used, were inoperable.  
A contributing factor in the outcome of the accident was opening the aft emergency exit 
on the right side of the aircraft before the aircraft came to rest.  The captain’s positioning of the 
aircraft relative to the wind accelerated the fuselage being penetrated by fire and it also rendered 
the aft, right side emergency exit inoperable.  Although it was opened, it couldn’t be used as an 
emergency egress path.  The opened door allowed airflow and smoke to enter the cabin, only 
accelerating the fatal components of the fire for the occupants inside.   
The quantity and chemical makeup of the smoke generated by the fire played a critical 
role in people’s inability to egress the aircraft.  Surviving passengers reported that only a breath 
or two of the smoke burned their throats and made them dizzy.  Passengers moved toward escape 
hatches only to become incapacitated due to smoke exposure.  Survivors reported that the 
forward cabin doors were piled with the bodies of unconscious passengers.  Also, the smoke 
prevented passengers from seeing available egress paths by masking visual cues.  Figure 20 
shows the thick black smoke billowing from the aircraft seen from a distance.   
 




Analysis showed the chemical composition of the smoke to be very toxic.  The 48 people 
who died of smoke inhalation were found to have incapacitating levels of carbon monoxide or 
hydrogen cyanide in their blood.  40 passengers had carboxyhemoglobin levels in excess of 30% 
and 43 people had blood concentration levels of cyanide in excess of 135 µg/100 ml. 30% 
saturation of carbon monoxide and 135 µg /100 ml of cyanide are the levels expected to cause 
incapacitation.  In total, 13 passengers had blood carboxyhemoglobin saturation levels of over 
50% and 21 passengers had cyanide levels over 270 µg/100 ml which are the fatal thresholds.  
Table 6 summarizes the blood results of the fatal passengers.  









Levels (µg/100 ml) 
40 30 (Incapacitating) 43 135 (Incapacitating) 
13 50 (Fatal) 21 270 (Fatal) 
While most of the fatal injuries were due to smoke, six people died from thermal 
exposure.  The injuries sustained due to thermal exposure were a result of the inability to egress 
the aircraft in an orderly and timely fashion.  The failure of the egress doors, hatches, and the 
obvious signs of fire that were engulfing the aircraft created panic amongst the passengers.  This 
panic caused people to climb over seats, congest the isle, trample others, and pile up in 
emergency exit rows further preventing people from egressing.  The panic coupled with 
incapacitating smoke resulted in many not being able to get out of the aircraft.  
Due to the outcome of the accident, the airport’s Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting 
(ARFF) was analyzed to determine if it was a contributing factor.  Some fire fighters heard the 
noise generated by the engine failure and saw the fire as the aircraft decelerated down the 
runway.  They initiated the ARFF response prior to getting the official emergency notification 




rest and both carried 50 kgs of Halon BCF, 817 liters of water, and 73 liters of Aqueous Film 
Forming Foam (AFFF).  Another two fire trucks arrived roughly 30 seconds after the first two 
and they carried 100 kgs of Halon BCF, 9,080 liters of water, 1,067 liters of AFFF in one truck 
and 13,620 liters of water, and 1,634 liters of AFFF in the other.  The fifth and last fire truck 
arrived on scene four to five minutes later as it had to be retrieved from the airfield’s paint shop.  
It carried 13,620 liters of water, and 1,634 liters of AFFF. 
While there were no issues with the initial response, there were problems resupplying the 
firefighting effort.  Water trucks carrying 7,272 liters of water were delayed at entry control 
points as police were not staged properly to escort them to the accident site.  There was also 
construction on going with the airport’s water hydrant system which caused about a 10 minute 
delay in obtaining resupply water.  
Seven minutes after the accident started, firefighters attempted to enter the aircraft to look 
for survivors but an explosion threw one of them from the aircraft.  It was determined that 
firefighters would not enter the aircraft until a water resupply could be reestablished due to the 
unsafe conditions.  After the water resupply was accomplished, fire fighters entered the aircraft 
to look for survivors.  After about 33 minutes, firefighters only found one person still alive but 
that person died at the hospital six days later.   
The investigation found that the ARFF response met all requirements and regulations for 
operating at Manchester Airport.  The response and capability of ARFF exceeded the minimum 
standards required for the operation of a Boeing 737.  The speed of the initial response was less 
than 30 seconds and the fire hydrant being tuned off for maintenance was not found to be a 
significant contributor to the outcome of the accident.  While communication and tactics were 




from established firefighting tactics.  Even with the acceptable ARFF response, all of the fatal 
injuries experienced in this accident were associated with being exposed to fire and the products 
produced by the fire (AAIB, 1989). 




The Red Bull Stratos Project was a flight test program privately funded by the company 
Red Bull and carried out between 2005 and 2012.  The project involved parachutist Felix 
Baumgartner jumping from both aircraft and helium filled balloons from varying altitudes.  On 
October 14, 2012, the program culminated in Felix jumping from an altitude of 127,852 ft. and 
achieved a maximum speed of 843.6 mph (Mach 1.25) during his descent.  The program broke 
the world records for the highest manned balloon ascent of 128,178 ft., the highest jump altitude, 
and the maximum vertical speed achieved by someone in freefall.  Felix was the first person to 
exceed the speed of sound in freefall without the protection or propulsion of a vehicle.  Figure 21 
shows the parachutist just prior to jumping from the capsule.  
 




The program included jumps from aircraft at an altitude of 27,000 ft. to test the pressure 
suit and physiological monitoring systems.  The testing also included jumps from helium 
balloons from altitudes of 71,581, 96,640, and 127,852 ft.  The program collected both medical 
and scientific data throughout the flight test program.  The Stratos Project shared some 
similarities with the U.S. Air Force Project Excelsior, which took place in late 1959 and 1960.  
Project Excelsior involved Colonel Joseph Kittinger jumping from helium balloons from 
altitudes of 76,400, 74,700, and 102,800 ft.  Joe Kittinger would serve on the Stratos Project 
under flight operations and safety where he was responsible for all communications with Felix 
during jumps throughout the program (Red Bull, 2020) (Jenkins, 2012).      
4.1.5.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
The Stratos Project was a successful program.  There were no major injuries or life 
threatening accidents.  In being proactive, the program developed a comprehensive medical 
support plan that focused on several survivability considerations.  Medical professionals were on 
the team where they identified six significant medical risks for the parachutist to include 
ebullism, barotrauma, decompression sickness, uncontrolled spin causing a relative negative 
acceleration  (-Gz), hypoxia, and trauma (Blue et al., 2014). 
To monitor the parachutist, physiological monitoring devices were used throughout the 
program.  An Equivital EQ01-1000, an accelerometer, and a strain gauge were used to measure 
the physiological responses of the jumper in real time throughout the parachuting events.  The 
Equivital system acted as an electrocardiogram (ECG) which monitored the jumpers heart.  The 
accelerometer measured tri-axial accelerations and the strain gauge was used to measure 
respiratory rate by sensing chest deflections.  The three systems were synched with a Global 




al, 2014).  All of the physiological monitoring systems were integrated into the pressure suit 
which can be seen in figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Pressure Suit Worn by Felix Baumgartner (Red Bull, 2020) 
Due to the nature of the test program, the medical plan outlined six discrete phases of 
flight that presented unique medical concerns.  The six phases are summarized in table 7.  
Table 7: Stratos Phases of Flight and Medical Risks (Blue et al., 2014, p. 533) 
Phase Activity Medical Concern 
1 Pre-breathe 100% oxygen pre-breathe, fire risk 
2 Capsule Ingress Limited visibility, fall risk, maintenance of gas supply lines 
3 Launch 
Tethered balloon precision release, crane/capsule acceleration, 
release failure with capsule fail, occupant trauma, support team 
injury 
4 Early Ascent 
<4,000 ft. AGL: balloon failure with limited time for parachute 
opening, high velocity traumatic landing 
5 Ascent/Freefall 
>4,000 ft. AGL: loss of pressure with hypoxia, decompression 
sickness, ebullism, flat spin during descent and freefall, traumatic 
landing 
6 Recovery Hazardous terrain in landing zone, wildlife, traumatic landing 
To reduce the risk of decompression sickness, the parachutist would pre-breathe 100% 
oxygen for two hours prior to the balloon launches.  This would help rid the blood stream of 




occurred.  When placed in the chamber containing 100% oxygen, the risk of a catastrophic fire is 
introduced.  To reduce the risk of fire, flame retardant materials were used and no open flames or 
smoking were allowed in the vicinity of the pre-breathe operation.  
After starting the pre-breathe procedure, the parachutist would remain in a pressurized 
suit for the duration of the mission and he would not breathe ambient air until after the jump had 
concluded.  Prior to being secured to the capsule, a risk to the jumper was the compromise of the 
suit’s gas supply lines which could result in the parachutist not receiving an adequate oxygen 
supply.  To reduce that risk, personnel would remain in the immediate vicinity of the parachutist 
any time he was not in the capsule to ensure that the gas supply lines remained functional and 
that oxygen was constantly being supplied.  
For both the launch and early ascent, the risk to the parachutist was failure of the capsule 
or of the launch process which could result in the capsule impacting the ground.  The capsule 
was not designed for crash protection.  If the crane used to position the capsule failed, or if the 
release failed, the capsule could fall which would expose the parachutist to blunt force trauma.  
Also, if the capsule or balloon were to fail before reaching 4,000 ft. Above Ground Level (AGL), 
the parachutist would not have adequate time to egress and successfully deploy his parachute 
possibly exposing the parachutist to blunt force trauma.  
Once the balloon exceeded 4,000 ft. AGL, the low pressure environment, freefall, 
parachute malfunction, and a hard landing were possible risks of injury for the parachutist.  The 
low pressure environment could cause ebullism, hypoxia, barotrauma, and decompression 
sickness.  Due to the very high altitude of the flights, if the pressure suit were to fail it would be 
possible for the parachutist to experience ebullism.  In addition to ebullism; hypoxia, barotrauma, 




After the parachutist egressed the capsule and began freefall, an uncontrolled flat spin 
could be potentially fatal.  If the jumper entered an uncontrolled flat spin, inertial effects could 
cause blood to collect in the head and foot areas of the body.  Excessive spin rates could “result 
in cardiovascular compromise, blood flow stagnation, arteriovenous pressure gradient loss, 
hypoxia, and intracranial hemorrhage or edema” (Blue et al 2014, p. 533).  To reduce the risk of 
injury, the physiological monitoring equipment would automatically deploy a drogue parachute 
if an uncontrolled flat spin were detected.  The drogue parachute is specifically designed to assist 
in arresting a spin.   
The last group of risks for the jumper included failure of parachute deployment and a 
rough or dangerous landing.  Main and reserve parachutes were used to minimize the risk of 
parachute deployment failures.  The reserve parachute was designed to deploy automatically in 
the case of incapacitation.  The drogue, reserve, and main parachutes were all varying designs 
and colors which allowed the team to quickly and easily identify which had deployed and initiate 
the appropriate medical response prior to the parachutist touching down.  
Given the peak altitude of the balloon and capsule, the potential landing area of the 
parachutist was significant.  The landing area was located in New Mexico and was generally flat, 
rocky, desert terrain with sparse brush less than three ft. tall.  A comprehensive hazard analysis 
was done on the selected landing area.  The analysis identified several hazards to include power 
lines, microwave transmission towers, oil field equipment, roads and highways, and wildlife such 
as venomous snakes.  All of these hazards could have resulted in injury to the parachutist if he 
became incapacitated during his descent or if he could not steer away from them.  Prior to 
egressing the capsule, its exact location was determined and the landing zone was reduced to a 




If the parachutist’s descent rate was not arrested properly prior to touch down, injury 
could result as he impacted terrain.  To reduce this risk, chase helicopters were used to monitor 
his descent and radio contact was maintained with the parachutist throughout the event.  If the 
parachutist descended under the reserve parachute and radio contact could not be positively 
maintained, a medical helicopter would be scrambled to the landing site where the parachutist 
would be recovered and immediately airlifted to predetermined trauma centers in the area (Blue 
et al, 2014).   




On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia, executing mission STS-107, 
broke up upon reentry into the earth’s atmosphere, resulting in the loss of all seven crew 
members.  STS-107 launched on January 16
th
, 2003, and was scheduled as a dedicated multi-
disciplinary scientific research flight that conducted multiple microgravity experiments over 16 
days.  The accident was the second and last space shuttle mishap that occurred over the life of 
the program.  
The cause of the breakup was determined to be failure of critical structure on the orbiter’s 
left wing during atmospheric reentry.  During the shuttle launch 16 days earlier, a piece of 
insulating foam from the shuttle’s main external tank broke away and struck the orbiter.  
Photograph and video analysis showed the piece of foam, roughly 21 to 27 inches long and 12 to 
18 inches wide, striking the orbiter at a relative velocity of between 416 to 573 mph.  The foam 
struck the leading edge of the left wing damaging the wing’s thermal protection system.  Figure 





Figure 23: Insulating Foam Strike from STS-107 (NASA, 2003, p. 34) 
While in low earth orbit, the space shuttle was traveling roughly 17,500 mph (Mach 25).  
Throughout the descent and re-entry to earth’s atmosphere, aerodynamic braking takes place.  
During aerodynamic breaking, the hypersonic flow around the orbiter caused the surrounding 
gasses to reach over 10,000 ºF.  By positioning the aircraft in a nose high attitude, shock waves 
and boundary layers are created to reduce the temperatures experienced at varying positions on 
the vehicle.  The temperature experienced on the leading edge of the wing where the failed 
thermal protection system was located can peak at over 3,000 ºF.  
The damaged thermal protection system allowed superheated gas to penetrate the wing 
which ultimately caused the aluminum wing structure to fail.  Once the left wing failed, the 
orbiter started to roll, pitch, and yaw uncontrollably.  The loss of control exposed the aircraft to 
excessive aerodynamic forces which ultimately caused it to break up in flight.  Figure 24 shows 
the orbiter from the ground streaking across the sky over the state of Texas in multiple pieces 





Figure 24: STS-107 on Re-Entry (NASA, 2003, p. 41) 
For a normal mission, the shuttle’s flight path would have traversed the states of 
California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida.  For the 
accident flight, the shuttle began breaking apart over California and continued to come apart over 
Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.  The debris from the shuttle was primarily 
recovered in the states of Texas and Louisiana.  Figure 25 shows the flight path of the Columbia 
orbiter for the accident flight.  The yellow dots represent debris shedding events observed from 
the ground (NASA, 2014). 
 




4.1.6.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
Immediately following the accident, thousands of volunteers were mobilized to search for 
the wreckage of the Columbia and the remains of the crew.  Initially crew recovery was 
conducted by the public self-reporting the findings of suspected human remains.  Soon after the 
accident, a trajectory analysis established a search corridor for the crew that was roughly one 
mile wide and 25 miles long near the Texas, Louisiana border.  Volunteers combed the search 
corridor and eventually remains from all seven crew members were recovered and positively 
identified.  Figure 26 shows the debris field for the crew, life support equipment, and the corridor 
used to search for the crew.  
 
Figure 26: STS-107 Crew Recovery Map (NASA, 2014, p. 36) 
Once recovered, the crew remains were transported to the Office of the Armed Forces 
Medical Examiner at Dover Air Force Base where the Air Force Institute of Pathology (AFIP) 
conducted the medical forensic analysis.  The AFIP determined that the cause of death for all 
seven crew members was blunt force trauma and hypoxia.  However, the accident investigation 
board reviewed the AFIP reports, it was found that the autopsy protocols used were inadequate to 




evidence gathering techniques considering the hypersonic, high altitude environment 
experienced by the crew.  As a result, further analysis was conducted and the cause of death was 
modified to blunt force trauma and unprotected exposure to high altitude.  
For the survivability analysis, the mishap was organized using two discreet events.  The 
first event was called the “Catastrophic Event” (CE) which occurred when the orbital fore body 
containing the crew module separated from the mid-body.  This event occurred between 181,000 
and 140,000 ft. and at a velocity of about Mach 15.  The second event was the “Crew Module 
Catastrophic Event” (CMCE) which included the complete breakup of the crew module.  The 
injuries experienced by the crew were complex, varied, and were broken down into five 
categories:   
1. Mechanical injuries experienced during the CE 
2. Depressurization injuries experienced after the CE 
3. Mechanical injuries experienced after the CE and before the CMCE 
4. Thermal injuries experienced after the CMCE 
5. Common injuries experienced during the CMCE and impact with the ground (NASA, 
2014) 
As the orbiter slowly began to lose control due to the left wing failure, the accelerations 
experienced by the crew would have been relatively minor.  Up to the point of CE, there was 
nothing observed which would have been injurious to the crew.  Once the fore body separated 
from the mid body, all electrical power, oxygen, communication equipment, and crew displays 
were lost. Once this occurred, the crew would have realized that they were in an emergency 
situation.  Crew members sustained injuries consistent with bracing positions indicating that they 




The crew module was a pressurized vessel in the fore body of the orbiter.  As the mid 
body and fore body separated, the crew module was free to displace, resulting in damage to the 
pressure vessel.  Depressurization of the crew module occurred due to a relatively small breach 
in the module structure and took place very rapidly at an altitude over 140,000 ft.   Analysis of 
the crew survival equipment showed that none of the crew had their visors down and sealed on 
their helmets and one crew member didn’t have their gloves attached to their suit.  As a result, 
the pressure suits worn by the crew would not have provided any protection from the low 
pressure environment.  Ebullism would have occurred immediately and if they survived the 
initial trauma due to ebullism, they would have been incapacitated within seconds due to 
hypoxia.  Gas bubbles indicative of ebullism were found in the crew’s brain and lung tissue, 
spinal cord, as well as bone marrow.  One crew member is known to have died due to the 
ebullism and the resulting pulmonary barotrauma.  There was lack of hemorrhage experienced 
during subsequent injury mechanisms indicating the cessation of circulatory function.   
After depressurization but before the crew module broke up, the accelerations 
experienced by the crew gradually increased in severity.  Analysis of the crew restraints 
indicated that all seven crew members experienced inadequate restraint of the upper torso.  Each 
crew position utilized a five-point restraint system along with an inertia reel on the shoulder 
restraints.  Due to the relatively low accelerations initially experienced by the orbiter, the inertia 
reels did not lock which would have allowed the shoulder restraints to pay out.  This would have 
resulted in the upper body of the crew not being properly restrained to the seat back.  Once 
incapacitated, the crew would have flailed around the crew module improperly restrained.  Most 




the weight of the helmet.  In addition to the fractured vertebra, all but one crew member 
experienced hemorrhages in the neck strap muscles.  
Most of the crew also experienced soft tissue scalp hematomas, skull fractures, and 
several types of brain hemorrhaging due to head flail.  The hemorrhaging proved to be critical in 
identifying which events occurred prior to death.  Once circulatory function stopped, 
hemorrhaging would no longer being possible.  For all of the crew, the head and neck injuries 
were indicative of the upper body flailing unsupported and striking various structures in the crew 
module prior to complete break up.  
The crew’s next source of injury was due to various thermal exposures after the breach of 
the crew module.  Once the command module was breached and depressurized, it allowed the 
super-heated gases associated with the airflow around the orbiter to penetrate the crew module.  
Analysis showed that the crew was exposed to very high thermal energy while still seated in their 
seats with their pressure suits on, resulting in very defined skin burns.  After some time, the crew 
module began to disintegrate, exposing the crew to the full airstream of the vehicle.  The wind 
blast and aerodynamic environment ripped the pressure suits and other survival gear from the 
crew.  The nude remains of the crew then passed through hypersonic gas flow and clouds of 
molten metal created by the obiter disintegrating and burning up.  Trace amounts of aluminum, 
titanium, and other metals were found impregnated in the skin of the crew.   
After the remains of the crew decelerated from hypersonic to subsonic velocities, they 
were then exposed to an altitude in excess of 100,000 ft.  Analysis showed injuries consistent 
with exposure to near vacuum, highly reactive monatomic oxygen, and freezing ambient 
temperatures.  The exposure to very low ambient temperatures was associated with the freefall 




that all respiration had ceased prior to exposure to any thermal events.  There were no 
contaminates in the blood that would indicate respiration taking place in a fire or high thermal 
environment.  
The last source of injury for the crew was the mechanical injuries experienced with the 
crew module disintegrating and the remains impacting the ground.  As the crew module violently 
broke up at altitude, the crew was still strapped into their seats.  The crew experienced blunt 
force trauma as the crew module disintegrated around them.  After being stripped of protective 
clothing due to windblast, the remains of the crew descended until they ultimately impacted the 
ground, resulting in even further blunt force trauma (NASA, 2014). 
As a result of the injuries experienced by the crew, there were five specific events which 
were attributed to potential lethal events.  They were:  
1. Depressurization of the crew module 
2. Unconscious crew member being exposed to dynamic environment with lack of proper 
restraint and non-conformal helmets 
3. Separation from the crew module and associated forces, material interactions, and 
thermal exposure 
4. Exposure to near vacuum environment, aerodynamic accelerations, and cold temperatures 
5. Impact with the ground (NASA, 2009, p. 3-89, 3-90) 




On April 29, 2013, a Boeing 747-400 BCF, operating as National Air Cargo Flight 102 
crashed shortly after takeoff from Bagram Air Base in Bagram, Afghanistan, resulting in the loss 




under a multimodal contract with the U.S. Transportation Command.  The flight was traveling 
from Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, with a final destination of Al Maktoum International Airport, 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  The aircraft was transporting five Mine-Resistant Ambush-
Protected (MRAP) vehicles.  Two of the vehicles were MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV), 
each weighing 12 tons, and three were MRAP Cougars each weighing 18 tons.  The accident 
flight was the first time that National Airlines had attempted to transport five MRAPs.  Figure 27 
shows the vehicle load out on the accident aircraft.  The blue boxes represent M-ATVs and the 
yellow boxes represent the Cougars. 
 
Figure 27: National Airlines Flight 102 Cargo Load Out (NTSB, 2015, p. 3) 
The cause of the accident was due to at least one of the MRAPs displacing aft in the 
aircraft during takeoff, resulting in damage to critical aircraft structures, systems, and a 
significant center of gravity shift which resulted in loss of control of the aircraft.  The cause of 
the MRAP displacement was found to be due to improper securing of the vehicles by the load 
master.  While refueling at Bagram, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript showed the 
crew discussing displacement of the cargo while in transit from Camp Bastion.  The captain, first 
officer, and the load master discussed how the cargo had moved a couple of inches and that some 
of the vehicle’s tie-down straps had loosened and broken.  There was nothing specific mentioned 
by any of the crew about how they would properly secure the load prior to their next departure. 
 It was found that the National Airlines’ procedures for cargo operations omitted critical 




main deck cargo handling system (Telair).  The procedures used by National Airlines contained 
unsafe and incorrect methods for securing cargo like the MRAPS being transported on the 
accident flight.  This omission of critical safety information ultimately resulted in the cargo 
being secured improperly for the accident flight.    
Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft entered a steep climb before it rolled to the right, 
descended, and impacted the ground roughly 590 ft. northeast of the departure end of the 
runway.  A large post-crash fire engulfed the wreckage site.  Pieces of the aircraft were found 
along the length of the departure runway to include hydraulic tubing, an M-ATV antenna 
assembly, and pieces of fuselage skin.  Figure 28 shows the debris field for the aircraft wreckage, 
the yellow arrow indicates north (NTSB, 2015). 
 
Figure 28: National Airlines Flight 102 Debris Field (NTSB, 2015, p. 6) 
4.1.7.2Survivability Considerations 
 
When evaluating survivability, the cause of death for the aircrew was listed as “multiple 
injuries” (NTSB, 2015, p. 19).  Due to the location of the accident, the Armed Forces Medical 
Examiner conducted the autopsies.  No specific injuries or mechanisms of death were identified 
in the NTSB final report and no survivability report was uploaded onto the NTSB docket system.  
Based on the accident site, a post-crash fire consumed most of the wreckage.  The injuries 




While the exact crew position during the accident is unknown, if any of the crew were in 
the aft cargo area during takeoff, they could have been exposed to the shifting MRAPs.  Based 
on the debris field, the MRAPs started causing substantial damage to the aircraft during the 
takeoff roll and prior to the aircraft impacting terrain.  The cargo weighed between 12 and 18 
tons. If personnel were in the area of the shifting cargo, serious injuries could have been 
sustained.    
The aircraft sustained significant damage due to the impact and post-crash fire.  The 
largest components to survive relatively intact were the horizontal stabilizers and the vertical tail.  
The front of the aircraft was mostly destroyed in the crash. The main wreckage site can be seen 
in figure 29.  Given the extent of the aircraft damage, blunt force trauma and or injuries resulting 
from exposure to fire would have been sustained during the aircraft’s impact with terrain (NTSB, 
2015). 
 
Figure 29: Flight 102 Main Wreckage Site (NTSB, 2015, p. 13) 




On July 19, 1989, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, experienced an uncontrolled engine 




Gateway Airport in Iowa.  The flight was conducted as a Part 121, scheduled passenger flight, 
operated as United Airlines Flight 232.  The engine failure caused the aircraft’s three hydraulic 
systems to lose pressure which resulted in a complete loss of the aircraft’s flight controls.  There 
were 296 people on board the aircraft, of which 112 died as a result of the accident.  
The cause of the engine failure was found to be due to a fatigue crack that formed and 
went undetected in the stage one compressor fan disk.  At an altitude of 37,000 ft. and just over 
an hour after takeoff, the fan disk failed in the tail mounted engine.  The engine components 
exited the engine case, and compromised the hydraulic lines of all three hydraulic systems on the 
aircraft.  Once the hydraulic systems lost pressure, the aircraft no longer responded to flight 
control inputs made by the crew.  For the remainder of the flight, the aircraft was controlled by 
throttle manipulation of the remaining two operational engines.  The aircraft declared an 
emergency and descended to Sioux Gateway Airport where it crash landed.    
Due to the loss of hydraulics, slats, flaps, and spoilers could not be used for landing.  This 
coupled with the loss of primary flight controls resulted in the aircraft landing at a higher than 
normal airspeed.  For the last 20 seconds before touchdown, the aircraft had an average airspeed 
of 215 knots and a sink rate of 1,620 ft. per minute (NTSB, 1990). 
4.1.8.2 Survivability Considerations 
 
United Airlines Flight 232 had a total of 296 people onboard to include 285 passengers 
and 11 crew.  Officially, 110 passengers and one crew member were killed, and there were 41 
passengers and six crew that received serious injuries.  One passenger with serious injuries was 
not listed as a fatality although he died 31 days after the crash as a direct result of the injuries he 
sustained in the accident.  In accordance with 49 CFR 830.2, for a death to be considered an 




31 days after the accident meant that he was not counted as an official fatality.  So while the 
official death count was 111 due to the CFR definition, there were 112 people who died as a 
direct result of the injuries they sustained in the accident.  
Of the 111 official deaths, 35 received fatal injuries due to smoke inhalation and the 
remaining 76 experienced blunt force trauma.  During the emergency descent, the crew 
jettisoned fuel, but the fuel dump system automatically shut off with 33,500 pounds of fuel 
remaining.  It was not possible to jettison all remaining fuel onboard the aircraft while in flight.  
On impact, the aircraft broke up into five different sections and caught fire. Most of the smoke 
inhalation fatalities occurred in the cabin area located over the wings.  The fatalities due to blunt 
force trauma were concentrated in the first class cabin and the tail section of the aircraft.  Figure 
30 shows how the aircraft broke up and the distribution of injuries throughout the aircraft.  The 
jagged lines represent aircraft fracture lines and shaded seat locations represent fatal injuries. 
Shaded seat locations with crosses in them represent fatalities due to smoke inhalation.   
 




Flight 232 had a total of four lap-held infants on the aircraft.  The infants were held by 
passengers sitting in seats 11F, 12B, 14J, and 22E.  All of the lap-held infants were seated in the 
section of the aircraft that separated and remained attached to the wings.  When preparing for 
landing, flight attendants instructed the parents to place their children on the floor and to hold 
them once they assumed the emergency landing braced position.  The parents seated in 11F and 
22E were unable to hold onto their child during the crash landing and could not find their 
children post-crash.  The parent in seat 12B noted that their child “flew up into the air upon 
impact” (NTSB, 1990, p. 40), but they were ultimately able to grab and hold them.  Of the four 
infants, one died due to smoke inhalation (NTSB, 1990). 
While none of the lap-held infants died as a result of blunt force trauma, the unrestrained 
infants were exposed to significantly higher risk of blunt force trauma.  They also exposed 
passengers seated in their immediate vicinity to projectiles throughout the crash event.  As the 
aircraft crash landed, the dynamics of the event exposed the occupants to relatively high 
accelerations and forces.  As the unrestrained infants moved freely about the cabin during the 
crash, any major collisions with other passengers or aircraft structure could expose both the child 
and hit passenger to blunt force trauma.  This blunt force trauma could result in serious or fatal 
injuries. 
4.2 Special Considerations - Escape Systems 
 
To prevent the risk of injuries associated with a crash, some aircraft may be equipped 
with escape systems to be used in the case of an emergency.  Currently CREEP doesn’t consider 
escape systems at all.  Escape systems are designed so that the crew can egress the stricken 
aircraft and separate before impact with the ground.  Escape systems may include things like 




their own survivability challenges.  The parachute was the first escape system to be used in 
aviation.  
4.2.1 Parachute Systems 
 
Parachutes are devices that are used to slow an object’s rate of descent through the 
atmosphere by significantly increasing aerodynamic drag.  Parachutes predate powered manned 
flight by hundreds of years.  Leonardo da Vinci was drawing sketches of parachutes in the late 
15
th
 century and the French were successfully jumping from balloons and observatories using 
parachutes in the 18
th
 century (Tuttle, 2002).  It wasn’t long after the Wright brothers took their 
inaugural flight in 1903 that the benefits of parachutes were applied to flying.  Documented 
jumps from airplanes started taking place as early as 1911 (Demers, 2020).  
Today, parachutes are used for a variety of reasons to include airdropping military assets, 
providing a safe means of escape for aircrew in the event of an emergency, as well as used in the 
sports of base jumping and skydiving.  There are many types of parachutes in use today and they 
mostly vary by the type of canopy used.  The three most common types are round, cruciform, 
and ram air.  Round parachutes are the simplest design, were the first to be used, and tend to be 
the hardest to control.  Cruciform parachutes use a square shaped canopy, can decrease landing 
speeds compared to round parachutes, and can reduce oscillations experienced during descent.  
Ram air parachutes are highly controllable, highly maneuverable parachutes whose canopy 
creates an airfoil when inflated.  By flaring or stalling a ram air parachute during landing, 
landing speeds can be very low.  Figure 31 shows the three types of parachutes (What Parachute 





Round      Cruciform   Ram Air 
Figure 31: Types of Parachutes (What Parachute Types Are There, 2019) 
When it comes to parachuting, there are several factors that can influence survivability.  
When evaluating survivability, the process of parachuting can be broken down into six discrete 
phases:  
1. Safe Separation 
2. Freefall 
3. Parachute Deployment 
4. Descent Under Parachute 
5. Landing 
6. Recovery 
For a successful bailout, all six phases must be executed properly and remain within human 
tolerances.  If any phase is unsuccessful or malfunctions, it can have a cascading effect on the 
remaining phases potentially resulting in serious injury or death.  A successful bailout starts with 
the safe separation phase. 
4.2.1.1 Safe Separation 
 
Safe separation includes the process of the parachutist gaining a safe distance from the 
aircraft or object they are jumping from.  If the parachutist is jumping from a stationary position 
such as base jumping, it is important to successfully gain a safe separation from objects as the 




result in blunt force trauma injuries.  In the case of egressing aircraft, it is important for the 
parachutists to successfully get to the egress door and clear the aircraft.  
Egressing an aircraft may be done for the sport of skydiving or during an emergency.  
When egressing during an emergency, the aircraft may not be under control or in steady level 
flight.  The task of simply getting from the occupant seat to the egress door may present hazards 
and sources of injuries.  Once at the egress door, it is important for the parachutist to get 
successful separation from the aircraft.  If the jumper strikes any portion of the aircraft while 
attempting to gain separation, blunt force trauma injuries may be experienced.    
Once separated, the parachutist will either accelerate or decelerate until they reach 
freefall or terminal velocity.  Terminal velocity is defined as the speed at which an object falls 
where the force of gravity is exactly equal to the force of aerodynamic drag.  At terminal velocity 
an object achieves equilibrium and stops accelerating.  Terminal velocity is considered freefall 
and varies based on atmospheric conditions and an individual’s size and body position relative to 
the free stream airflow.  The terminal velocity of a typical parachutist can vary from between 
125 to 300 mph (Westman, 2005).  During the Red Bull Stratos project, Felix Baumgartner 
exceeded 820 mph during his freefall from over 120,000 ft. in altitude.   
If a jumper is egressing an aircraft, the parachutist may accelerate or decelerate when 
hitting the free stream velocity depending on the airspeed of the aircraft.  If the aircraft is flying 
faster than the jumper’s terminal velocity, they will decelerate.  Conversely, if the aircraft is 
flying slower than the jumper’s terminal velocity, they will accelerate.  If egressing from a high 
performance aircraft, flail injuries may be experienced if the jumper egresses the aircraft at too 




called the “wind blast”, may be high enough to cause flail injuries to the jumper’s limbs, head, 
and neck.  
4.2.1.2 Freefall 
 
Once the parachutist reaches terminal velocity, they are considered to be in freefall.  The 
hazards that are present during freefall include instability, midair collisions, the immediate 
surroundings, and the environment.  The risk of instability and spins were addressed in section 
4.1.5, the Red Bull Stratos project.  During freefall there is a potential that the parachutist could 
contact other jumpers, birds, aircraft debris, or any other objects in the airspace.  Due to the high 
speeds involved in freefall, midair collisions could result in blunt force trauma injuries.  Another 
source of injury during freefall is the jumper’s immediate surroundings and environment.  
Depending on the altitude where egress is initiated, the high altitude environment may 
present survivability challenges.  If jumping from altitudes above 10,000 ft., supplemental 
oxygen may be required based on exposure times.  The lack of supplemental oxygen can cause 
hypoxia which can reduce awareness, render someone unconscious, and even result in death.  
Low temperatures are also a consideration when considering the environment.  Low ambient 
temperatures coupled with the high descent rates associated with freefall, increase the risk of 
cold weather injuries such as frostbite and hypothermia.  Frostbite or reduced dexterity may 
prevent the parachutist from successfully operating the parachute.  Unsuccessful parachute 
deployment or failure to operate the parachute properly may result in ground impact at a high 
rate of speed.  
Another consideration is adverse weather.  Weather specific hazards to parachutists 
during freefall include factors such as lightning, hail, drowning, and freezing rain.    Adverse 




become statically charged which exposes them to a higher risk of lightning strikes.  Some 
thunderstorms can also produce significant hail stones.  Striking those hail stones may result in 
blunt force trauma injuries. In addition, if the concentration of condensed water is high enough 
within a cloud, it may be difficult for the parachutist to breathe.  Due to the violent updrafts 
associated with some types of clouds, freefalling through a cumulonimbus cloud may expose the 
jumper to the risk of drowning.  While hypothermia and frostbite have already been addressed, 
freezing rain during freefall has the potential to accelerate the onset of those conditions (Pretor-
Pinney, 2007). 
4.2.1.3 Parachute Deployment 
 
Parachute deployment is one of the most critical phases of parachuting.  Failure of the 
parachute to properly deploy and achieve full canopy inflation can lead to excessive descent rates 
resulting in serious injuries during landing.  Parachute deployment methods can vary based on 
application.  They can be deployed automatically though systems such as static lines or 
automatic activation systems.  They can also be deployed manually by the parachutist typically 
by pulling a handle or rip cord of some sort.  There are many causes of failure of a parachute to 
deploy properly such as failure of the deployment system, jumper instability or improper 
positioning, excessive speed, incorrect packing procedure, or multiple deployments.  During the 
deployment process, improperly fit equipment also poses a significant risk of injury.  
Regardless of the deployment method, it is important that the system activate properly 
and within the design limits of the parachute.  If a static line were to fail, if a parachutist fails to 
pull their activation handle, or if an automatic deployment system fails to function, the parachute 
may not deploy at all which could cause the jumper to impact terrain at terminal velocity.  If 




time to inflate and properly arrest the rate of descent before landing.  Between the years of 1964 
and 2003, 11 skydiving fatalities in Sweden were associated to a complete lack of parachute 
activation or initiating parachute activation at a low altitude (Westman, et. al, 2005).   
Prior to parachute deployment, it is critical that the jumper be in a stable, proper position 
and that the parachute’s deployment speed is appropriate for the specific parachute.  Improper 
and unstable body position resulted in three fatalities in the U.S. Army in the five year period 
from 2010 through 2015 (Johnson, et. al. 2019).  Instability such as an uncontrolled spin or 
improper body position can cause the parachute to malfunction during deployment or it can 
become entangled around the head and neck, which can result in cervical spine injuries or 
suffocation.  
Excessive speed at parachute deployment can result in high opening shock loads, 
parachute damage and failure, or parachute malfunction.  If a parachute is deployed outside of its 
designed operating range, the parachute inflation can result in excessive loads being applied to 
the parachutist.  If opening shock loads are too high, the parachutist can experience compressive 
injuries to the spine and flail injuries to the head and neck.  Opening shock loads may also cause 
failure to the canopy or parachute lines, which may produce an unstable parachute or 
malfunction which can result in higher descent speeds at landing.  
A parachute that is incorrectly packed may experience deployment malfunctions.  As the 
parachute deploys, the lines spread and the canopy inflates.  If not packed properly, the lines can 
tangle or interfere with the canopy, preventing proper inflation resulting in higher decent speeds.  
The last source of parachute deployment malfunction is when multiple deployments occur. 
Most man-mounted parachute systems only use one parachute for descent.  To reduce the 




parachutist to jettison the main parachute in the case of malfunction or failure.  However, when 
both the main and reserve parachutes are deployed simultaneously, they may become entangled.  
Entangled parachutes may prevent the proper inflation of both parachute canopies or make the 
parachutes impossible to control.  One fatality was attributed to multiple parachute deployments 
in Swedish skydiving between 1964 and 2003 (Westman, et. al, 2005). 
When using a parachute, it is critical that the parachute harness be properly sized and 
fitted to the parachutist.  An improperly sized or very loose fitting harness could result in the 
harness failing to secure the parachutist to the parachute or also result in injuries during 
deployment.  During parachute deployment, the opening shock loads could cause the parachutist 
to completely fall from an improperly fit or loose harness.  An improperly worn harness could 
also result in the transfer of opening shock loads to incorrect parts of the body such as the head 
and neck causing serious or fatal injuries (M. Mackenzie, personal communication, August 19, 
2020). 
4.2.1.4 Descent Under Parachute 
 
Once the parachute has successfully deployed and the canopy is fully inflated, the 
parachutist’s descent rate will be arrested from their freefall speed.  The hazards associated with 
descending under parachute are very similar to the hazards of freefall, including midair collisions 
and the environment. 
Much like in freefall, midair collisions expose the parachutist to the potential of blunt 
force trauma injuries.  But while descending under parachute, midair collisions can also result in 
both parachute malfunction and entanglement.  Similar to multiple deployments, entanglement 
due to a midair collision reduces the effectiveness of both the parachutes involved and a 




in the U.S. Army between 2010 and 2015 (Johnson, et. al. 2019).   In addition to midair 
collisions, the jumper’s local surroundings and environment exposes the jumper to risk of injury. 
Much like during freefall, the local environment and adverse weather can pose a serious 
threat.  While the threats of hypoxia, hypothermia, frostbite, lightning strikes, drowning, and 
blunt force trauma also exist under canopy, something unique to the environment during descent 
is the parachute interacting with the adverse weather.  In 1959, after ejecting at 47,000 ft. over a 
severe thunderstorm, Lt. Col. William Rankin took over 40 minutes to descend.  During his 40 
minute descent he was exposed to freezing temperatures, lightning, threat of drowning, hail, and 
an extremely turbulent environment.  If parachuting in storms, severe updrafts can interact with 
the parachute and pull the parachutist skyward.  Even with parachute deployment at altitudes 
with low risk of hypoxia, storms can grab the parachutist and send them to unsafe altitudes.  
Once in the storm, the turbulent environment may also cause damage to the parachute itself.  
Any damage to the canopy or parachute lines may reduce the effectiveness of the parachute and 
may result in excessive landing speeds (Pretor-Pinney, 2007). 
4.2.1.5 Landing 
 
As the parachutist descends, they will lose altitude until they eventually impact terrain. 
The area where a parachutist lands is referred to as the “landing zone”.  If parachuting operations 
are planned, landing zone hazards can be identified ahead of time to minimize risks.  However, if 
parachuting is done as a result of an emergency egress, mitigating the risks associated with a 
landing zone may not be possible.  Hazards that can impact survivability during landing include 
terrain features, landing zone hazards, and excessive descent rates.  
The landing zone should ideally be flat, unobstructed, soft terrain that allows the 




areas can result in the parachutist experiencing blunt force trauma or impalement injuries during 
landing.  Man-made obstructions in the landing zone can also present hazards to parachutists.  
Some of the landing zone hazards identified during the Red Bull Stratos project included 
power lines, microwave transmission towers, oil field equipment, and roads.  Other landing zone 
hazards include fire, and aircraft wreckage.  If parachuting is a result of emergency egress, it is 
possible for the ditched aircraft to crash in the landing zone, resulting in a post-crash fire.  If 
possible, it is important for the parachutist to steer away from the aircraft wreckage or any other 
hazards in the landing zone.  In addition to landing zone hazards, excessive landing speeds can 
result in serious injuries.    
It is important to note that parachutes only reduce the descent rate of a parachutist.  The 
new T-11 cruciform parachute used by the U.S. military has a descent rate of about 13 mph 
(Johnson, et. al., 2019).  Depending on the total weight of the jumper, atmospheric conditions, 
and the design of the parachute, descent rates can vary significantly.  An important consideration 
is that the descent rate only represents the vertical speed of the parachutists.  Factors such as 
winds and control inputs can impact the longitudinal and lateral speeds.  For round and cruciform 
parachutes, excessive winds in the landing zone can significantly increase landing speeds.  Due 
to the flying nature of ram air parachutes, control inputs can create very high landing speeds for 
the parachutist.  As landing speeds increase, the risk of experiencing blunt force trauma during 
landing also increases.  
To reduce the risk of injury at any landing speed, the Parachute Landing Fall (PLF) may 
be used when the landing speed is primarily in the vertical direction.  The PLF is intended to 
reduce the risk of injury to the legs and back by spreading out the landing forces over the entire 




effectiveness of a PLF is reduced as longitudinal and lateral landing speeds increase. Figure 32 
illustrates how to conduct a proper PLF.  
 
Figure 32: Parachute Landing Fall (PLF) (Johnson, et. al. 2019, p. 640) 
4.2.1.6 Recovery 
 
After the parachutist successfully lands, it is important that they secure their parachute 
and recover as quickly as possible.  Recovery is similar to post-crash factors when evaluating 
CREEP and it shares many of the same survivability considerations.  The considerations that are 
unique to parachuting during recovery are failure to secure parachute, tree landings, and water 
landings.  
If landing in high winds, failure to secure the parachute after landing can result in the 
parachute canopy remaining inflated and dragging the parachutist across the landing zone.  If the 
winds are high enough, the parachute can drag the jumper at significant speeds, resulting in blunt 
force trauma injuries.  Being dragged through the drop zone resulted in two fatalities in the U.S. 
Army between 2010 and 2015 (Johnson, et. al. 2019). 
Landing in trees presents another hazard to parachuting.  While impalement injuries were 
already discussed during landing, it is also possible for the parachutist to become suspended high 




suspended in trees may not be easily accomplished.  A high fall presents a significant source of 
injury for a parachutist.   
Something also unique to parachuting is landing in water.  When parachuting over water, 
it is critically important for the parachutist to separate and distance themselves from their 
parachute immediately after landing.  While emergency egress and water survival is covered 
under CREEP, parachutes provide a unique drowning hazard.  Even with the use of supplemental 
flotation systems, parachutes can adversely interact with the water and cause drowning.  By 
interacting with water currents, the parachute canopy can act as a sea anchor and drag the 
parachutist under the surface.  In addition to the sea anchor effect, the parachute lines may also 
become entangled around the parachutists preventing them from swimming and remaining afloat.  
Drowning resulted in four fatalities in Swedish skydivers between the years of 1964 and 1973 
(Westman, et. al, 2005).   
4.2.2 Ejection Seat Systems 
 
Up to and including much of World War II, the primary means of escape from an aircraft 
was by bailing out with a parachute.  However, as aircraft performance increased, it became clear 
that bailing out was becoming less and less effective.  As air speeds increased, the ability for 
crew to react fast enough, overcome aerodynamic forces, and gain successful separation from the 
aircraft decreased (Copp, et. al, 2015). 
A high percentage of aircraft accidents occur during takeoff and landing.  Due to the 
higher landing and takeoff speeds of high performance aircraft, traditional energy absorbing and 
crashworthy structures became less effective at protecting aircrew.  While in the air, higher 
aerodynamic forces make it difficult to egress and clear aircraft structures such as horizontal and 




egress was clear and the ejection seat was born (G. Paskoff, personal communication, July 2, 
2019). 
The first ejection seats were mostly manual systems and used compressed air to assist the 
occupant in clearing the aircraft.  After gaining aircraft separation, the occupant was responsible 
for manually separating from the seat and deploying the parachute.  The Germans pioneered the 
use of ejection seats during World War II where they had over 60 successful escapes using 
ejections seats (Newman, 2017).  
The first ejection from an aircraft using explosives was done in July 1946 by using a 
Martin-Baker system.  A modified Gloster Meteor F-3 was used to conduct an ejection test 
where Sir Bernard Lynch was ejected using a MB Mk-1 seat at an attitude of 8,000 ft. and at an 
airspeed of about 300 mph.  It took Lynch over 30 seconds to successfully gain seat separation 
and successfully deploy his parachute.  Over the years, ejection seats have changed significantly.  
To overcome the potential issue of clearing the very large tail on the F-104, ejection seats were 
designed to eject the pilot downward.  However due to killing several pilots during ejections in 
close proximity to the ground, those systems are rarely in use today (Copp, et al., 2015).  
Today, modern ejection seats have become more automated and can protect aircrew over 
a much broader range of conditions.  The most advanced ejection seats can autonomously 
execute the entire ejection sequence including initiation.  In 1946, it took over 30 seconds to get 
parachute deployment once clear of the aircraft.  Today, that process can take less than 0.3 
seconds (Copp, et al., 2015).  
While there are many different models of ejection seats specifically tailored to individual 
aircraft types, they all share similar characteristics.  There are nine discreet phases of a 




1. Ejection Initiation 
2. Aircrew Positioning 
3. Canopy/Hatch Jettison/Fracturing 
4. Aircraft Separation 
5. In-Seat Descent and Stabilization 
6. Parachute Deployment 
7. Occupant-Seat Separation 
8. Parachute Descent 
9. Landing  
10. Recovery (M. Mackenzie, personal communication, August 19, 2020) (J. Santiago, 
personal communication, August 18, 2020) 
For a successful ejection to take place, all ten phases must be executed and function 
properly.  If any phase is unsuccessful or malfunctions, it can have a cascading effect on the 
remaining phases potentially resulting in serious injury or death.  A successful ejection starts 
with the ejection initiation phase.  
4.2.2.1 Ejection Initiation 
 
The first phase of an ejection starts with the activation and initiation of the ejection seat 
system.  For a majority of ejection seats, this is accomplished by the aircrew pulling on a handle 
attached to their seat typically located between their legs.  Prior to ejection initiation, it is critical 
that ejection initiation takes place within what is referred to as a “safe escape envelope”. 
The safe escape envelope will vary between specific systems and aircraft.  It is a 
combination of multiple factors such as ejection seat performance, aircraft airspeed, attitude, 




instantaneous.  While many of the ejection phases are measured in milliseconds, it takes time for 
a successful ejection to occur.  The safe escape envelope is made up of a set of specific 
conditions that have been tested and verified to show that a successful ejection is possible 
without the risk of serious injury.  While fatal injuries are not necessarily guaranteed for an out 
of envelope ejection, testing has shown that serious or fatal injuries are likely to occur (N. 
Schombs, personal communication, August 19, 2020). 
4.2.2.2 Aircrew Positioning 
 
After ejection has been initiated, the next phase of the ejection is ensuring proper aircrew 
position.  Prior to egressing the aircraft, aircrew must be specifically positioned for the ejection 
sequence.  On modern ejection seats, proper aircrew position is accomplished mostly by 
automatic systems that may interact with the occupant’s arms, legs, torso, and head. Limb 
restraints may pull the aviator’s arms or lower legs in toward the seat from their outreached 
position such as on aircraft controls or rudder pedals.  Restraints on the torso harness may pull 
back on the shoulders, placing the aviator in an upright position.  Head restraints may deploy to 
place the occupants head in a stable, forward looking position.  
The ideal position for the aviator during an ejection is as upright as possible, their arms 
and legs tucked in close to the ejection seat and their head upright and facing forward. Proper 
aircrew position is critical for the subsequent phases of ejection.  The risk of injury associated 
with improper body position will be covered in each specific phase (J. Santiago, personal 
communication, August 18,2020) (N. Schombs, personal communication, August 19, 2020). 
4.2.2.3 Canopy/Hatch Jettison/Fracturing 
 
Once initiated, the aircraft must be prepared for the ejection sequence.  Ejection seat 




create a clear path for egress, the canopy/hatch is either jettisoned or explosively fractured.  The 
purpose of getting rid of the canopy/hatch is to allow the aviator to escape without contacting the 
aircraft thereby reducing the risk of injury.  In some systems, canopies/hatches are jettisoned 
using ballistic and rocket charges while others use explosives for fracturing.  Figure 33 shows the 
canopy of a CF-18 being jettisoned immediately after the initiation of an ejection.   
 
Figure 33: CF-18 Canopy Jettison (Copp et. al, 2015) 
While canopy jettison or fracturing is useful, it isn’t necessarily required on most modern 
ejection seats.  Current systems are designed with cutters on the top of the seat that will penetrate 
and cut through the canopy/hatch in the case of a jettison/fracturing failure.  A successful 
ejection may still be possible in the case of jettison/fracturing failure however, the aviator must 
be appropriately sized for the seat to avoid serious injury.  If the sitting height is high enough 
that the occupant’s helmet is higher than the top of the ejection seat, they will contact the failed 
canopy or hatch resulting in the risk of serious head and neck injury.  For the cutters to work 
properly with no risk of injury, the aviator must be short enough that they do not strike their 
head.  Another risk of injury during ejection initiation is with the canopy fracturing system.  
During the canopy fracturing process, molten metals may be produced which can strike 
the occupant.  It is important that prior to initiating ejection, that the aviator properly use all of 




protective clothing.  Failure of the occupant to properly wear their helmet with a lowered visor 
could result in molten metals becoming impregnated in their face and eyes.  While not 
immediately a life threatening injury, the injury could result in loss of vision which could 
compromise post-ejection survival considerations such as steering the parachute away from 
hazards, or the effective use of a life raft or survival radio (M. Mackenzie, personal 
communication, August 19, 2020). 
Another important consideration for ejection seat equipped aircraft is rapid 
decompression.  While the aircraft may be pressurized to accommodate the altitude of the 
aircraft, as soon as ejection is initiated and the canopy/hatch is compromised rapid 
decompression will occur.  Unless a pressure suit is worn by the crew, the risk of decompressive 
injuries increases if ejection is initiated in a high altitude low pressure environment (Pretor-
Pinney, 2007). 
4.2.2.4 Aircraft Separation 
 
Occupant separation from the aircraft starts once the aircrew is placed in the proper 
position and the aircraft has been prepared for egress.  In modern ejection seats, this is 
accomplished by both a catapult mounted to the aircraft and an under-seat rocket motor.  During 
this phase, the occupant may be exposed to significant forces in the vertical, longitudinal, and 
lateral directions.  Vertical forces are experienced due to the catapult and under-seat rocket 
motor accelerating the occupant up and out of the aircraft.  Longitudinal and lateral forces may 
be experienced due to the occupant hitting the aircraft’s wind blast.  
When dealing with vertical accelerations, it is critical that the occupant be in an upright 
position as an upward spine position provides the optimal biomechanical tolerance to injury.  




Gs (Newman, 2017).  If the aviator is out of position, compressive injuries to the spine such as 
ruptured vertebral disks or compressive fractures may be experienced.  Also, if the crew is out of 
position they can strike the aircraft as they are catapulted resulting in significant injuries.  In 
addition to position, the occupant’s anthropometric measurements may impact survivability. 
Some ejection seats may have only one mode of ejection when accounting for weight.  
The catapult and under-seat rocket motor apply a fixed load regardless of occupant size.  If the 
aviator is too light, the accelerations experienced can exceed human tolerances and cause 
compressive injuries to the spine.  If the aviator is too heavy, the system may not have enough 
energy to guarantee successful aircraft separation and they may strike the aircraft or not gain 
enough ground clearance.  If an occupant’s height and weight are not sized correctly for the seat, 
adverse interactions between the seat and torso harness may cause injury (G. Paskoff, personal 
communication, July 2, 2019).  In addition to vertical accelerations, the occupant may be 
exposed to significant longitudinal and lateral accelerations.   
In high performance aircraft high airspeeds are common.  The occupants of the ejection 
seat are instantaneously exposed to the free stream airflow as they gain aircraft separation.  Like 
during bailout procedures, this airflow is often called the wind blast.  The aircraft wind blast can 
expose the occupant to significant aerodynamic forces.  Depending on aircraft attitude at the time 
of ejection, the occupant may experience significant longitudinal and lateral forces.  Aircraft 
with very high yaw angles at the time of ejection can expose the aviator to higher lateral 
windblast forces. Limbs that are not properly secured may experience flail injuries.  It is 
important that helmets be designed and secured to the head appropriately.  If the helmet is not 




 In the case of aircraft with multiple crew, the aircraft separation phase is executed in a 
predetermined sequence at slightly different directions.  To prevent the risk of midair collisions 
of occupants seated in their ejection seats, aircraft with multiple ejection seats do not fire all of 
the seats simultaneously.  The ejection seats will fire at different times and in different directions 
to ensure that safe separation is maintained between the multiple ejection seats once separated 
from the aircraft.  Due to the longer time needed to egress multiple crew members, the safe 
escape envelope will be impacted when compared to a single seat aircraft (N. Schombs, personal 
communication, August 19, 2020).   Figure 34 shows the aircraft separation phase from a CF-18. 
 
Figure 34: CF-18 Aircraft Separation (Copp et. al, 2015) 
4.2.2.5 In-Seat Descent and Stabilization 
 
Depending on the airspeed and altitude of the aircraft when ejection is initiated, the 
occupant may remain in their seat for a considerable amount of time.  Throughout the ejection 
process, modern ejection seats will automatically measure both altitude and airspeed using 
integrated barostatic measuring units and autonomously select a mode of ejection.  The main 
parachute will only deploy if the seat is low and slow enough to safely due so.  Deployment at 
too high of an airspeed can result in significant damage to the parachute and excessive opening 
shock loads.  To reduce high altitude exposure times, the seat will delay parachute deployment 




with emergency oxygen for the aviator, the oxygen supply may not be enough for an extended 
parachute descent from high altitude.  Depending on both altitude and airspeed, the ejection seat 
will select a mode of ejection that optimizes survivability.  Figure 35 shows the various modes of 
ejection for a MK-14 ejection seat with respect to ejection altitude and airspeed (Ford, 1985).   
 
Figure 35: MK-14 Modes of Ejection (Ford, 1985) 
During high speed ejections, a significant risk of injury to aircrew is the acceleration 
forces due to aerodynamic drag.  Drag can create acceleration forces in excess of 30 Gs as the 
seat decelerates to its terminal velocity (Copp et. al, 2015).   Improper positioning of the 
occupant can result in aerodynamic forces causing instabilities in the seat as it flies through the 
air.  Unsecured arms or legs can act like asymmetric sails causing instabilities which can cause 
injury and the seat to tumble.  Drogue parachutes may be used during the in-seat descent and 




tumbling seat can cause injuries to the occupant in the same way a flat spin can injure a 
parachutist which was discussed in section 4.2.1.2.  Another risk of injury during stabilization is 
the direction of loads applied to the occupant.  
Ideally, the accelerations caused by drag during seat stabilization and descent are mostly 
in the longitudinal direction relative to the occupant.  Human tolerances to accelerations are the 
highest in the longitudinal direction.  However, if there is seat instability, the accelerations due to 
drag can be experienced in the vertical and lateral directions as the seat tumbles.  If ejecting from 
a very fast aircraft, the decelerations coupled with an unstable seat can cause compressive 
injuries to the spine as well as displace vital organs which can result in serious injury or death 
(N. Schombs, personal communication, August 19, 2020). 
Seat stabilization is also critical for successful parachute deployment.  Main parachute 
deployment during tumbling presents similar risks as an unstable parachutist.  Parachute lines 
can tangle, and the parachute may become entangled in the seat and/or occupant which may 
prevent the canopy from inflating properly and result in excessive descent rates.  
4.2.2.6 Parachute Deployment 
 
Once the seat is at both a safe altitude and airspeed, modern seats will automatically 
deploy the main parachute.  If the ejection is in close proximity to the ground, ballistic assistance 
may be automatically used to decrease the time required for full parachute canopy inflation. The 
risk of injury to an aviator during parachute deployment in an ejection seat is very similar to the 
risks of injury of a parachutist.  For the risk of injury during parachute deployment refer to 
section 4.2.1.3.  One unique source of risk for modern ejection seats is the potential for failure of 




As previously stated, modern ejection seats use barostatic measuring devices to determine 
both airspeed and altitude.  The system measures altitude by calculating pressure altitude based 
on static pressure compared to the standard atmosphere.  As a result, the barostatic measurement 
unit only measures altitude Above Sea Level (ASL), not AGL.  If ejecting in a very high 
mountainous area with terrain over 15,000 ft. ASL, the system may not automatically deploy the 
main parachute in time to successfully get full canopy inflation.  While there are manual 
overrides to the automatic parachute deployment system, they are only effective if the aircrew is 
conscious and aware of the terrain hazard.  If the hazard is not properly recognized or the crew is 
incapacitated, an ejection in a mountainous environment with high altitude terrain may result in 
blunt force trauma due to failure of the main parachute to deploy.  
4.2.2.7 Occupant Seat Separation 
 
It is critical that the occupant remain attached to the seat until it is safe to separate.  
Drogue parachutes may be used during the in-seat descent and stabilization phase to both slow 
and stabilize the ejection seat.  Once the seat has reached a safe speed and altitude, the occupant 
will separate from the seat at roughly the same time as main parachute deployment.  Failure of 
the occupant-seat separation phase could result in excessive descent rates while descending 
under the parachute due to the additional weight of the seat. Adverse interactions with the seat 
and main parachute can degrade the performance of the parachute system.    
4.2.2.8 Parachute Descent 
 
Once the occupant has been separated from the seat and the parachute has successfully 
deployed, the risk of injury to the aviator are exactly the same as a parachutist.  The risk of injury 
during parachute descent, landing, and recovery are outlined in section 4.2.1.  For specific risks 






For the risk of injury during parachute landing, refer to section 4.2.1.5. 
4.2.2.10 Recovery  
 
For the risk of injury during parachute recovery phase, refer to section 4.2.1.6. 
4.2.3 Escape Capsules 
 
In the case of supersonic, or hypersonic vehicles, an ejection seat may not be practical 
due to aerodynamic considerations.  The forces due to drag and the extreme thermal environment 
associated with high speed flow may exceed human tolerances when using traditional ejection 
seats.  The first person to survive a supersonic ejection in an open seat was George Smith, a 
production test pilot for North American Aviation.  He ejected from his stricken F-100 Super 
Sabre in 1955 at a speed of Mach 1.05.  While he survived he “was in a coma for six days and 
couldn’t see for a month.  He suffered liver and kidney damage and had to have his gall bladder 
removed as well as about 17 ft. of his intestines.  Every joint in his arms and legs had been 
dislocated” (Tuttle, 2002, p 163).  To overcome the obstacles of high speed escape, an 
encapsulated seat or fully contained escape module may be used.   
Supersonic bombers such as the B-58, and the XB-70A used fully encapsulated ejection 
seats while the supersonic fighter, the F-111 used a crew escape module (Tuttle, 2002).  The 
Mercury and Apollo spacecraft had launch escape systems for early rocket failures while the 
SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule has an emergency escape function which can operate for the entire 
ascent phase of the mission in the case of failure (Reisman, 2015).  Figure 36 shows examples of 





F-111 Crew Escape Module 
 
XB-70 Encapsulated Ejection Seat 
Figure 36: Crew Escape Module and Encapsulated Ejection Seat (Tuttle, 2002)   
Escape modules share similarities to both parachutes and ejection seats.  As a result, they 
also share similar survivability concepts.  When evaluating survivability, there are five discreet 
phases to consider:  
1. Vehicle Separation 
2. Descent 
3. Descent Arrest 
4. Landing 
5. Recovery 
To ensure the survivability of crew using escape capsules, all five phases must be 
executed and function properly.  If any phase is unsuccessful or malfunctions, it can have a 
cascading effect on the remaining phases potentially resulting in serious injury or death.  A 
successful escape using an escape module starts with the vehicle separation phase. 
4.2.3.1 Vehicle Separation 
 
With high speed, high energy vehicles, it may be necessary to completely separate from 
the transport vehicle in the case of an emergency to ensure safety of the crew.  For rockets 
designed to carry human payloads, trajectory deviations or system failures may warrant 




separation to ensure survivability of the people onboard.  Failure to separate from the vehicle 
may expose the people onboard to excessive accelerations due to aerodynamic loads, vehicle 
instabilities, impact with terrain, or the energies associated with a rocket explosion.  
Similar to parachuting, it is critical that during vehicle separation, the process takes place 
without any adverse interactions occurring between the escape capsule and vehicle.  If clean 
vehicle separation doesn’t occur, the capsule thermal protection systems may be damaged, life 
support systems may be compromised, or the capsule occupants may be exposed to blunt force 
trauma.  It is also critical that the vehicle separation phase be initiated within the appropriate safe 
escape envelope.  
Much like with ejection seats, escape capsules are going to have a safe escape envelope. 
The safe escape envelope will be a function of the vehicle’s airspeed, attitude, altitude, and the 
performance of the escape capsule itself.  Failure to initiate escape within the safe escape 
envelope may expose the crew to an increased risk of injury.  
4.2.3.2 Descent 
 
After vehicle separation, it is critical that the capsule or escape module have a stable 
descent.  Aerodynamic interactions with the vehicle during separation may cause instabilities.  
Excessive rotation rates or tumbling may expose the occupants of the capsule to accelerations 
that can exceed human tolerances.  Stability may be accomplished with the assistance of drogue 
parachutes or rocket thrusters.  During an abort sequence, the SpaceX Crew Dragon’s capsule 
accomplishes stability through the use of up to four rockets mounted to the capsule (Reisman, 
2015).  The rocket thrusters can automatically fire to arrest any instability that may exist in the 





4.2.3.3 Descent Arrest 
 
Prior to the escape capsule or module impacting terrain, it is critical that the descent rate 
be arrested.  Excessive descent rates at landing can expose the capsule occupants to very high 
accelerations.  Descent arrest can be accomplished through the use of parachutes, rocket motors, 
airbag systems, or combinations of various systems.  When using parachutes, it is critical that the 
parachutes be designed appropriately for the expected deployment speeds.  Deploying parachutes 
at excessive speeds can cause parachute damage resulting in excessive descent rates.  Airbag 
systems may be used to arrest descent rates during landing by acting as energy absorbers.  
Rockets may be fired at the terminal area of landing to arrest decent rates.   
4.2.3.4 Landing 
 
During the landing phase, the survivability considerations for capsules are similar to 
those of parachutists.  While the capsule may provide protection from the occupants impacting 
the ground, man-made hazards in the landing zone still present a risk of injury.  Airbags and 
inflatable systems may be used to stabilize the capsule and provide buoyancy when impacting 
water.  Other sources of injury include excessive descent rates at the time of landing.  
4.2.3.5 Recovery 
 
Once on the ground, the considerations for escape modules are very similar to post-crash 
factors when evaluating CREEP.  If parachutes are used to arrest descent rates, the recovery risks 
for escape modules are the same for parachutists.  For post-crash factors, the risks include 
survival factors such as water egress, weather and the local environment, wildlife interactions, 





5.1 CREEP Baseline  
 
Crash survivability started with the pioneer Hugh DeHaven and his four principles.  As 
the father of crashworthiness, DeHaven’s principles provided the foundation for the modern 
survivability standard CREEP.  When analyzing a crash, investigators use the acronym to 
systematically study and thoroughly evaluate each component.  The components of CREEP are 
not mutually exclusive and each may rely on other survivability components to ensure that 
human tolerances are maintained and survival is accomplished.  Each facet of CREEP, container, 
restraint, environment, energy absorption, and post-crash factors are complex and may contain 
multiple factors and subsystems to consider.   
Starting with container, the vehicle must provide protection and maintain survivable 
space for occupants throughout a crash event.  Container also considers the shedding of high 
mass items and designing the vehicle so that it does not crush or plow as methods for providing 
protection.  Restraint refers to limiting occupant flail and mitigating the energy of the aircraft 
occupants throughout a crash.  Environment considers the delethalization of the immediate 
surroundings and within an occupant’s flail envelope.  Energy absorption focuses on reducing 
crash loads to within human tolerances.  And post-crash factors consider the elements of egress 
and survival after the crash event has concluded.  The survivability considerations for each 
component are summarized below: 
 Container 
o Survivable space must be maintained 
o Airframe hardening 




 Structure must maintain shape throughout crash  
 Emergency egress locations hardened 
o Retention/Shedding of high mass items 
o Structurally designed to prevent plowing 
 Restraint 
o Mitigate energy of occupant throughout crash 
o Limit occupant flail 
o Must maintain tie-down chain 
o Must transmit loads to skeletal structure of occupant 
o Should be designed appropriately for application 
 Environment 
o Delethalization of occupant’s surroundings 
 Keep objects out of flail envelope 
 Add padding or design to be frangible 
o Environment free from toxic fumes 
 Energy Absorption 
o Reduces loads experienced by occupants of aircraft 
o Should reduce loads to within human tolerances 
 Human tolerances may vary based on individual factors 
 Post-Crash Factors 
o Post-Crash fire  
 Respiratory injury 




 Toxic gasses 
 Emergency egress critical to reduce risk of post-crash fire 
o Over or under water egress 
o Exposure to the elements 
 Weather/Local Environment 
 Wildlife 
 Availability and use of flotations systems 
 Personal flotation acceptable for warm water 
 Rafts necessary for cold water immersion 
o Quick access to medical care 
o Prompt rescue operations 
5.2 CREEP Deficiencies 
After evaluating the case studies, CREEP was evaluated for each accident to identify 
deficiencies in the acronym.  Many of the case studies emphasized survivability considerations 
that occurred outside of conditions dealing with a crash. For many of the accidents, crashes never 
took place.  Each additional survivability consideration from the case studies was assigned to one 
of the five components of CREEP.  Starting with container, Delta Airlines Flight 1288, and 
Trans-Canada Airlines Flight 304 emphasized the need for fuselage hardening from high energy 
projectiles.  The Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 and Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 accidents 





5.2.1 Container  
For most aircraft, the engines are placed in a position such that if they fail and are not 
contained, they may strike the fuselage, potentially injuring the occupants.  Due to very high 
rotation rates, engine failures can cause significant damage with the potential to result in 
catastrophic consequences.  During full scale tests on blade strike prevention composite fuselage 
shielding, a section of propeller blade weighing 6.8 kilograms was released while traveling at 
1120 RPM.  Immediately after release, the blades achieved a linear velocity of 162 meters per 
second (m/s).  At over 160 m/s, the 6.8 kilogram blade had a kinetic energy of 91,094 joules 
(Pereira et al, 2016). 
When considering the kinetic energy required to cause serious injury, a propeller blade 
with over 91,000 joules of energy exceeds established levels by multiple orders of magnitude.  
There is a 90% probability of death when being struck in the head with an object having just 150 
joules of energy.  There is a 90% probability of death when hit in the torso by an object having 
500 joules of energy (Henderson, 2010).  While the energy of over 91,000 joules is before 
contact with the fuselage, without specific shields in place, the structure of an aircraft cabin is 
not expected to slow the projectile to safe speeds if striking the fuselage is inevitable.   
The high energy components associated with failing engines have a significant potential 
to penetrate an aircraft and cause serious injuries.  It is important that the engine case and aircraft 
fuselage be designed appropriately to prevent aircraft penetration from high energy debris.  
While engine cases can be used to contain failed engine components, fuselage shielding may be 
required for turboprop or propeller driven aircraft.  During Delta Airlines Flight 1288 and Trans-




passengers, resulting in fatal injuries.  Expanding the potential for projectiles from failed 
engines, another unique threat to aviation is wildlife, specifically birds.   
There were roughly 16,000 wildlife strikes reported to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in 2018 (FAA Wildlife Strike Database, 2020).  While wildlife strikes can 
cause failure of critical aircraft systems like both engines during the US Airways Flight 1549 
accident, bird strikes can also potentially penetrate the aircraft, causing injury to the crew on the 
flight deck.  Modern aircraft structures and engines are specifically designed to be resistant to 
bird strikes.  Transport category aircraft are required to not allow any penetration of their 
windscreens when impacted with a four pound bird at the aircraft sea level design cruise speed  
(Windshields and Windows, 2020).  While some design considerations have been made to 
protect against bird strikes, objects more rigid than birds or weighing significantly larger than 
four pounds still have the potential to penetrate the aircraft and cause injuries.  While evaluating 
survivability, it is important for the container to protect its occupants from all projectiles during 
an accident event.  Failure to do so can result in serious injuries and as a result it is an additional 
concern for evaluating container in the acronym CREEP.   
Another consideration when evaluating container is the protection from the high speed 
aerodynamic environment.  During the Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 accident, the shuttle 
orbiter broke up at hypersonic speeds in excess of 100,000 ft. in altitude.  This exposed the crew 
to extreme temperatures and aerodynamic forces.  For aerodynamic flow, once speeds exceed 
roughly 100 m/s, air will adiabatically compress around the object which results in a temperature 
rise (Anderson, 2011).  The surrounding gas temperatures of over 10,000 ºF observed during the 
shuttle reentry is caused by the aerodynamic adiabatic compression that takes place.  As speeds 




Supersonic and hypersonic vehicles can experience very high surrounding temperatures.  When 
in a high speed environment, it is critical that the vehicle maintain structural integrity and 
provide protection from the surrounding aerodynamic environment.  Failure of the vehicle can 
expose the occupants to extremely high temperatures and aerodynamic pressures.  
When George Smith ejected at a speed of Mach 1.05 in 1955, he experienced serious 
injuries. The aerodynamic forces he was exposed to resulted in dislocation injuries to both of his 
arms and legs.  He sustained severe internal injuries which ultimately resulted in the loss of 17 ft. 
of his intestines (Tuttle, 2002).  During the Southwest Airlines 1308 accident, the fatal injuries 
experienced by the passenger were a direct result of being exposed to the aerodynamic flow 
outside of the aircraft while being restrained to her seat.  The aerodynamic environment at high 
speeds can potentially cause serious or fatal injuries.  In addition to the lack of protection 
provided by the vehicle container, Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 and the Space Shuttle 
Columbia STS-107 accidents emphasized significant restraint issues.   
5.2.2 Restraint  
Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 and STS-107 both experienced restraint system issues 
and neither restraint problem had to do with the dynamics associated with a crash event.  During 
Flight 1380, a passenger was not properly restrained.  While her restraint did keep her secured to 
her seat, it did not properly restrain her upper torso inside the aircraft.  While the circumstances 
surrounding the accident were certainly unique, had the occupant been properly restrained inside 
the aircraft it is unlikely she would have received fatal injuries.  
During the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the restraint systems failed to prevent 
injuries before the orbiter broke up or impacted terrain.  During the mishap event, it was noted 




relatively low accelerations experienced as the orbiter began to lose stability did not activate the 
automatic locking feature of the inertial reels used on the torso restraints.  After the crew became 
incapacitated due to the low pressure environment, they were no longer able to react or actively 
brace as the aircraft lost control.  As accelerations increased, cervical fractures, skull fractures, 
and hemorrhages of the neck muscles were experienced indicating violent upper torso flail.   
The two accidents emphasize the importance of proper restraint even outside of crash 
events.  Restraint systems can reduce occupant flail throughout any dynamic event.  They can be 
effective during loss of control, aerobatic, or emergency events and can prevent injuries prior to 
a vehicles impact with terrain.  Focusing on a restraint systems use only during a crash can 
potentially miss out on other survivability issues that face restraint systems.  While some of the 
case studies emphasize survivability concepts with container, and restraint, almost all of them 
emphasize survivability considerations with the environment.    
5.2.3 Environment  
A safe local, surrounding environment around all occupants is critical in ensuring 
survivability.  As previously discussed, the vehicle itself plays a vital role in ensuring a safe 
environment by maintaining its container.  Failure of the container may expose the occupants to 
extreme temperatures, intrusion into the survivable space, and high energy projectiles.  But not 
all hazards are presented from sources outside the aircraft.  Hazards such as extreme 
temperatures, high energy projectiles, and low pressures can also be experienced inside the 
aircraft.  
Occupants in the British Airtours 28M and the STS-107 were exposed to extreme 
temperatures.  The British Airtours 28M fire created both toxic fumes and the extremely high 




failure during its takeoff roll and it never became airborne, the ensuing fire resulted in the deaths 
of 55 people.  Exposure to high temperatures resulted in six of the 55 fatalities.  While post-crash 
factors in CREEP does consider a post-crash fire and environment considers toxic fumes inflight, 
neither evaluate the high temperatures of a fire outside conditions of a crash.  Inflight or ground 
fires have the potential to expose passengers to both toxic fumes and high temperatures which 
can cause serious injuries or death.  
The STS-107 crew experienced both extremely high and extremely low temperatures.  
Once the crew module broke up, the occupants were exposed to hypersonic airflow.  The air 
surrounding the crew was thousands of degrees Fahrenheit.  After some time, aerodynamic drag 
would have arrested the speed of the crew.  Once they slowed down, they were exposed to the 
very low temperatures of the high altitude environment.  At high altitude, the temperature can be 
as low as -70 ºF (Anderson, 2011, p. 1074).  Injuries due to both high and low temperature 
exposures were experienced by the crew of the STS-107.  Although the orbiter broke up and no 
longer provided protection, the case study illustrates the potential extremes of temperatures 
experienced during space flight.  To prevent injuries, it is important for systems to be in place to 
protect occupants from the high and low extreme temperatures of high speed, high altitude flight.   
As already discussed, failure of the container to prevent cabin penetration can expose 
occupants to high energy projectiles.  But not all projectiles have to originate from sources 
outside the aircraft.  Objects such as unrestrained cargo or lap-held infants have the potential to 
cause serious injury or death during a dynamic event.  During the National Airlines Flight 102 
accident, vehicles weighing over 12 tons displaced in the aircraft during takeoff ultimately 
causing the aircraft to crash.  Anyone exposed to the rolling vehicles would have been at risk of 




unrestrained.  The unrestrained passengers became projectiles during the crash, exposing the 
passengers themselves and other passengers in the surrounding area to high energy projectiles.  
Current federal regulation in the United States allows children under the age of two to be 
held on a person’s lap for the duration of a flight.  During Flight 232, the lap-held infants were 
not successfully restrained by their parents and they became projectiles.  As a result of this 
accident, the NTSB released a Safety Recommendation on May 30, 1990 specifically 
recommending that the FAA “Revise 14 CFR 91, 121 and 135 to require that all occupants be 
restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, and that all infants and small 
children below the weight of 40 pounds and under the height of 40 inches be restrained in an 
approved child restraint system appropriate to their height and weight” (Kolstad, 1990, p. 7).  
The safety recommendation emphasized the risks of unrestrained occupants to both themselves 
and other people on the aircraft.    
The last environmental consideration for survivability was emphasized by both the Red 
Bull Stratos project and the STS-107 accident.  The low pressure environment associated with 
high altitude poses several survivability issues such as barotrauma, decompression sickness, 
ebullism, and hypoxia.  Barotrauma is caused by the rapid expansion of gas in the body when 
decompression occurs.  Systems in the body that have trapped gasses such as the middle ear, the 
paranasal sinuses, the lungs, and the intestines can be subject to injury or discomfort when rapid 
decompression takes place.  While barotrauma can be extremely painful, it rarely results in 
serious or fatal injuries (Davis, 2008).  Decompression sickness however can potentially be more 
serious.   
Decompression sickness is specifically attributed to the dissolved gasses in the body 




oxygen pre-breathe operation conducted during the Red Bull Stratos project was specifically 
aimed at reducing the risk of decompression sickness.  It is often referred to as the “bends” and is 
commonly associated with diving.  Much like during ascent while diving, aviation has the 
potential to expose occupants to rapid decompression which can cause decompression sickness.  
In the most extreme cases, gas bubbles “within the central nervous system can cause cerebral 
ischemia and stroke-like symptoms, and bubbles within the pulmonary vasculature can lead to 
complete cardiovascular collapse and death” (Davis, 2008, p. 271).  In addition to decompression 
sickness, at very high altitudes the low pressure environment can cause ebullism which can also 
be fatal.  
“Ebullism is the spontaneous evolution of water from liquid to gaseous state in tissues at 
an ambient pressure of 47 mmHg or less, where the boiling point of water is less than or equal to 
the homeostatic temperature of the human body” (Murray, et. al, 2013, p. 89).  The ambient 
pressure of 47mmHg is typically experienced at an altitude often referred to as the “Armstrong 
Line” of about 63,000 ft.  When water begins to evaporate in the body, it causes tissue damage in 
the process which can be “characterized by diffuse alveolar damage, tissue edema, and 
hemorrhagic lung” (Blue, et. al 2014, p. 532).  While decompression sickness is associated with 
dissolved gasses in the body, ebullism is associated with evaporating water.  When exposed to 
pressure altitudes exceeding roughly 63,000 ft. ebullism can result in extensive histologic 
damage at the cellular level of the body.  It can also result in the same cardiovascular collapse 
associated with extreme decompression sickness.  Ebullism is often fatal as there are few 
treatment options available (Blue, et al, 2014).  Ebullism was the cause of death for at least one 
of the crew members of the Columbia.  The last serious risk associated with low pressure 




Hypoxia is defined as “the state of O2 deficiency in the blood cells and tissues significant 
enough to cause impairment of function” (U.S. Army, 2019, p. 2-13).  There are several types of 
hypoxia to include histotoxic hypoxia, hypemic hypoxia, stagnant hypoxia, and hypoxic hypoxia.  
Histotoxic hypoxia is the inability of a cell to use delivered oxygen and is typically associated 
with a toxin or poison introduced into the body such as cyanide.  Hypemic hypoxia is associated 
with a decrease in the oxygen carrying capability of blood and is typically caused by anemia or 
carbon monoxide poisoning.  Stagnant hypoxia is caused by inadequate blood flow and can be 
caused by a variety of cardiovascular diseases or impairments.  The type of hypoxia associated 
with the low pressure environment is hypoxic hypoxia (Davis, 2008).  
Hypoxic hypoxia is caused by the degradation of alveolar oxygenation which causes a 
lack of oxygen diffusion into the blood.  As pressure altitude increases, the partial pressure of 
oxygen decreases and worsens the severity of hypoxia.  At altitudes above roughly 10,000 ft., the 
partial pressure of oxygen gets low enough in standard air to start impairing the process of 
alveolar oxygenation.  Breathing pure oxygen may help by increasing the partial pressure of the 
gas, but it does not eliminate the risk.  Even if breathing pure oxygen, the pressure of the 
atmosphere experienced at 30,000 ft. will result in hypoxic hypoxia.  When breathing standard 
air at pressure altitudes in excess of 35,000 ft., the time of useful consciousness is measured in 
seconds.  After exceeding the time of useful consciousness, significant cognitive impairment or 
incapacitation may be experienced. Table 8 shows time of useful consciousness with respect to 







Table 8: Time of Useful Consciousness (Jenkins, 2012) 
Altitude (ft.) Time of Useful Consciousness 
10,000 Nearly Indefinitely  
18,000 20-30 minutes 
25,000 3-5 minutes 
30,000 1-3 minutes 
35,000 30-60 seconds 
43,000 5-10 seconds 
50,000 0-5 seconds 
63,000 0 seconds 
Hypoxia can cause loss of consciousness as well as neurological and physiological 
impairment.  At very high altitudes, hypoxic hypoxia can be fatal.  Even ignoring the threats of 
decompression sickness and ebullism, the altitudes achieved during the Red Bull Stratos project 
were high enough that failure of the pressure suit would have been fatal for Felix Baumgartner.  
During the STS-107, accident cabin pressurization was lost in excess of 100,000 ft. and the crew 
were not wearing their pressure suits properly to protect them from the low pressure 
environment.  While there were several fatal events that took place, hypoxia was one of the 
primary causes of death for all but one member of the shuttle crew.   
5.2.4 CREEP Deficiency Summary  
Based on the case studies evaluated, several deficiencies were identified.  The case 
studies emphasized issues with container, restraint, and the environment components of CREEP.  









Table 9: Case Study Survivability Summary 
Case Study Survivability Consideration 
Delta Airlines Flight 1288 Failed turbine engine penetrated cabin 
Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 Failed to restrain occupant inside cabin 
Trans-Canada Airlines Flight 304 Failed propeller penetrated cabin 
British Airtours Flight 28M Extreme Temperatures due to fire 
The Red Bull Stratos Project 
Parachuting 
High altitude environment 
The Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 
Inflight restraint failure 
High altitude environment 
Extreme temperatures 
Hypersonic/supersonic environment 
National Airlines Flight 102 Unrestrained cargo 
United Airlines Flight 232 Unrestrained passengers (lap-held infants) 
Each deficiency identified by the case studies was assigned to CREEP and is summarized below:  
 Container 
o Protection from high energy strikes 
 Engine failure 
 Bird/Wildlife strikes 
o Protection from high speed airflow 
 Extreme temperatures 
 Extreme pressures 
 Restraint 
o Restraint is important even before the crash 
 Restrain occupant inside vehicle 
 Secure upper torso to prevent flail 
 Environment 
o Thermal environment (extreme temperatures) 




 Aerodynamic thermal environment 
 High altitude, low temperature 
o High energy, high mass items striking occupants 
 Projectiles 
 Unrestrained passengers/lap-held infants 
 Unrestrained cargo 
o High altitude, low pressure environment 
 Decompression sickness 
 Ebullism 
 Hypoxia 
5.3 Escape Systems 
In addition to the case studies evaluated, escape systems were studied and to outline 
survivability factors.  Systems such as parachutes, ejection seats, and escape capsules provide a 
means of survivability that may be completely independent of a vehicle crashing.  At first, 
parachutes were used as an entertainment act often demonstrated at carnivals in front of large 
crowds.  It wasn’t long after the invention of the airplane that the parachutes benefit to aviation 
was realized.  The parachute allowed pilots to jump from stricken aircraft and avoid crashing 
completely.  When using an escape system, it is assumed that the occupants are no longer with 
the vehicle when it ultimately impacts terrain.   
The survivability considerations of the various escape systems are unique and they don’t 
fall squarely within any current component of CREEP.  In fact, none of the escape systems fall 
within the traditional “crashworthy” framework.  They are designed specifically so that 




their design is to ensure safe separation and prevent the occupants from going down with the 
aircraft ensuring that they avoid the crash all together.  The first escape system to be 
implemented was the parachute.     
5.3.1 Parachuting Summary 
Parachutes are most commonly used for the sport of skydiving.  Parachutes are also used 
as a means of safe escape for pilots who wish to jump from their aircraft in the case of an 
emergency.  Parachutes are frequently used for aircraft performing hazardous activities such as 
acrobatic flight, air racing, and transporting skydivers.  Effective bailout is limited to relatively 
slow speed aircraft.  There are several survivability considerations that should be made when 
evaluating parachutes.  Parachuting can be separated into six discrete events, each with their own 
survivability factors.  They are:   
 Safe separation 
o Clear obstacles 
o Get to egress door and successfully clear the aircraft 
o Egress at appropriate speeds to minimize windblast 
 Freefall 
o Instability 
o Midair collisions 
o Environment 
 Hypoxia 
 Low temperature 
 Adverse weather 




o Deployment system failure 
o Jumper instability or improper positioning 
o Excessive speed 
o Incorrect packing procedure 
o Multiple deployments 
o Properly fitting harness 
 Descent under parachute 
o Midair collisions 
o Environment 
 Hypoxia 
 Low temperature 
 Adverse weather 
 Landing 
o Terrain features 
 Impalement injuries 
 Blunt force trauma 
o Man-made landing zone hazards 
o Excessive descent rates 
o Successful PLF 
 Recovery 
o Failure to secure parachute 
 Being dragged through landing zone 




o Water landings and drowning 
o Weather exposure 
o Wildlife interaction 
o Quick access to medical care 
o Prompt rescue 
5.3.2 Ejection Seat Summary  
Ejection seats are typically used in high performance aircraft commonly owned and 
operated by state governments.  But not all ejection seat equipped aircraft are owned by 
government agencies.  In 2012, the NTSB released a Safety Recommendation specifically 
addressing the hazards associated with investigating mishaps involving aircraft equipped with 
ejection seats.  The safety recommendation specifically cites use in Aero Vodochody L39C 
aircraft registered to Fighter Town USA, LLC and operated under Part 91 regulations (Hersman, 
2012).   
There are also cases of military aircraft being demilitarized and sold to private 
individuals.  A private owner operating as Nalls Aviation Inc. in California, Maryland, owns and 
operates AV-8B Harrier aircraft fully equipped with ejection seats.  The owner performs at 
airshows demonstrating the aircraft’s vertical takeoff and landing capabilities (TheBaynet.com, 
2014).  There are many survivability considerations that should be evaluated when investigating 
an accident involving an ejection seat.  The process of a safe ejection can be broken down into 
ten discrete events, each with their own survivability factors.  They are: 
 Ejection initiation 
o Safe escape envelope 




 Canopy/Hatch jettison/fracturing 
o Properly sized aviator 
o Properly using ALSS 
o Decompressive injuries 
 Aircraft separation 
o Proper aircrew position 
o Proper aircrew sizing 
o Midair collision 
o Flail injuries due to windblast 
 In-Seat descent and stabilization 
o Seat stabilization 
 Deceleration forces primarily applied longitudinally 
 Stabilize seat for parachute deployment 
 Parachute deployment 
o Ejection over high altitude terrain 
o Deployment system failure 
o Jumper instability or improper positioning 
o Excessive speed 
o Incorrect packing procedure 
o Multiple deployments 
o Properly fitting harness 
 Occupant-seat separation 




 Descent under parachute 
o Midair collisions 
o Environment 
 Hypoxia 
 Low temperature 
 Adverse weather 
 Landing 
o Terrain features 
 Impalement injuries 
 Blunt force trauma 
o Man-made landing zone hazards 
o Excessive descent rates 
o Successful PLF 
 Recovery 
o Failure to secure parachute 
 Being dragged through landing zone 
o Tree landing and fall 
o Water landings and drowning 
o Weather exposure 
o Wildlife interaction 
o Quick access to medical care 




5.3.3 Escape Capsule Summary 
Escape capsules are primarily used on very high speed aircraft or rocket propelled 
vehicles.  They can be used on supersonic fighters, bombers, or rocket propelled space vehicles.  
In the final investigation report for the Space Shuttle Columbia, the lack of adequate protection 
from vehicle damage and the lack of an escape system were specifically noted as contributing 
factors that led to the outcome for the shuttle crew.  The report stated “future crewed-vehicle 
requirements should incorporate the knowledge gained from the Challenger and Columbia 
accidents in assessing the feasibility of vehicles that could ensure crew survival even if the 
vehicle is destroyed” (NASA, 2009, p. XXII).  For this reason, the new Crew Dragon capsule 
designed by SpaceX implements an emergency escape function that can be used at any point 
during the launch sequence.   
There are several survivability considerations that should be evaluated when investigating 
escape capsules.  The process of escape using a capsule can be separated into five discrete 
events, each with their own survivability factors.  They are: 
 Vehicle separation 
o Clear vehicle without damage 
o Safe escape envelope 
 Descent 
o Stable descent 
 Descent arrest 
o Excessive speed 





o Landing zone hazards 
o Excessive descent rates 
 Recovery 
o Failure to secure parachute 
 Being dragged through landing zone 
o Tree landing and fall 
o Water landings and egress 
o Weather exposure 
o Wildlife interaction 
o Quick access to medical care 
o Prompt rescue 
6.0 Conclusion 
CREEP is the modern industry standard for evaluating survivability.  As demonstrated 
during the literature review, CREEP and survivability are synonymous with crashworthiness.  It 
is based on the crashworthy pioneer Hugh DeHaven’s four principles and by evaluating 
container, restraint, environment, energy absorption, and post-crash factors, investigators can 
systemically and methodically evaluate the survivability of an airplane crash.  The final 
component of CREEP, post-crash factors emphasizes the acronym’s focus on a crash by 
explicitly using the word.   However, this should not be the case.   
There is much more to survivability than just what happens during a vehicles impact with 
terrain.  Aviation is a constantly evolving and increasingly complex industry.  As technology 
continues to change and shape the logistics of how people travel, the survivability considerations 




established in the 1950s are still very relevant today, they don’t fully capture the complexities of 
current aviation systems and neither does CREEP.  Companies like Virgin Galactic and SpaceX 
are planning to begin commercial passenger space flights within the close of the decade and 
NASA is planning on making humans an interplanetary species by sending astronauts to our 
neighboring planet Mars.  As our aviation systems evolve, so should the methods of conducting 
accident analysis.  In evaluating CREEP, there are several survivability considerations that aren’t 
included in the current acronym.   
 The case studies and special considerations show that there are many survivability 
considerations that are independent of a crash.  For many of the accidents studied, the aircraft 
didn’t crash and in some cases they didn’t even get airborne.  Except for the Red Bull Stratos 
project, all of the case studies evaluated involved fatal injuries.  The special consideration of 
escape systems emphasize that there are many survivability concepts that are completely 
independent of crashworthy concepts.  Escape systems survivability concepts are completely 
independent of a crash.  When using escape systems it is assumed that the occupants are no 
longer with the vehicle once it impacts terrain.  Until now, escape systems were totally separate 
and independent of CREEP.  By redefining the survivability acronym, it is possible to expand it 
to be a more encompassing, comprehensive tool that can be better utilized by accident 
investigators.  
Currently, when evaluating CREEP, some of the components may have dependent 
relationships with other facets while others can be independent.  Emergency egress during post-
crash factors relies on the successful activation and use of emergency exits which must be 
hardened to ensure they maintain their function by the container.  Energy absorption relies on the 




things like quick access to medical care, prompt rescue, and wildlife interaction are independent 
of other survivability considerations.  In redefining the acronym, this relationship still holds true.   
CREEP should be expanded to include survivability considerations that occur outside of a 
crash.  This includes considerations such as high energy projectile protection, protection from the 
high speed aerodynamic environment, protection from extreme temperatures, and the 
considerations of a high altitude low pressure environment.  The acronym should be also be 
redefined to include escape systems.  Due to the fundamental nature of energy absorption 
occurring during extreme vehicle dynamics, CREEP should be redefined to consider energy 
absorption or escape systems.  Post-crash factors should be redefined to “post-event factors” to 
eliminate the assumption that a crash has taken place.  Therefore, the new definition of CREEP is 
Container, Restraint, Environment, Energy absorption/Escape, and Post-event factors.  The 
following is a summary of the factors that influence survivability using the new acronym is:  
 Container 
o Survivable space must be maintained 
o Airframe hardening 
 Prevent intrusion into aircraft 
 Structure must maintain shape throughout crash 
 Emergency egress locations hardened 
o Retention of high mass items 
o Structurally designed to prevent plowing 
o Protection from high energy strikes 
 Engine failure 




o Protection from high speed airflow 
 Extreme temperatures 
 Extreme pressures 
 Restraint 
o Mitigate energy of occupant throughout crash 
o Limit occupant flail 
 Restrain occupant inside vehicle 
 Secure upper torso 
o Must maintain tie-down chain 
o Must transmit loads to skeletal structure of occupant 
o Should be designed appropriately for application 
 Environment 
o Delethalization of occupant’s surroundings 
 Keep objects out of flail envelope 
 Add padding or design to be frangible 
o Environment free from toxic fumes 
o Thermal environment (extreme temperatures) 
 Exposure to fire 
 Aerodynamic thermal environment 
 High altitude, low temperature 
o High energy, high mass items striking occupants 
 Projectiles 




 Unrestrained cargo 
 Energy Absorption/Escape 
Energy Absorption 
o Reduces loads experienced by occupants of aircraft 
o Should reduce loads to within human tolerances 
 Human tolerances may vary based on individual factors 
Escape 
o Safe Separation 
 Clear obstacles 
 Get to egress door and successfully clear the aircraft 
 Egress at appropriate speeds to minimize windblast 
 Separate from main vehicle without damage 
o Freefall 
 Instability 
 Midair collisions 
 Environment 
 Hypoxia 
 Decompression sickness 
 Low temperature 
 Adverse weather 
o Ejection Initiation 
 Safe escape envelope 




o Aircrew positioning 
o Canopy/Hatch jettison/fracturing 
 Properly sized aviator 
 Properly using ALSS 
o Aircraft separation 
 Proper aircrew position 
 Proper aircrew sizing 
 Midair collision 
 Flail injuries due to windblast 
o Descent and stabilization 
 Stable descent 
 Seat stabilization 
 Deceleration forces primarily applied longitudinally 
 Stabilize seat for parachute deployment 
o Parachute deployment 
 Ejection over high altitude terrain 
 Deployment system failure 
 Jumper instability or improper positioning 
 Excessive speed 
 Incorrect packing procedure 
 Multiple deployments 
 Properly fitting harness 




 Midair collisions 
 Environment 
 Hypoxia 
 Low temperature 
 Adverse weather 
o Landing 
 Terrain features 
 Impalement injuries 
 Blunt force trauma 
 Landing zone hazards 
 Excessive descent rates 
 Successful PLF 
 Post-Event Factors 
o Post-event fire  
 Respiratory injury 
 Thermal injury 
 Toxic gasses 
 Emergency egress critical to reduce risk of post-accident fire 
o Over/Under water egress 
o Exposure to the elements 
 Weather/Local Environment 
 Wildlife 




 Personal flotation acceptable for warm water 
 Rafts necessary for cold water immersion 
o Failure to secure parachute (Escape Systems) 
 Dragged through landing zone 
o Tree landing and fall (Escape Systems) 
o Water landings and drowning (Escape Systems) 
o Quick access to medical care 
o Prompt rescue operations 
 The new acronym is more comprehensive and it covers a much wider range of aviation 
systems.  By using the new definition of CREEP, investigators don’t have to just focus on 
accidents that involve a crash or an aircraft impacting terrain.  The new definition represents an 
analysis that was conducted during a snapshot in time.  Considering the dynamic nature of 
technology as it relates to aviation, accident analysis should be constantly evolving.  While 
maintaining the acronym CREEP isn’t essential, the analysis of survivability as it relates to 
aviation should be a living evolving concept.  If other survivability issues are identified in the 
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